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Towards a Transatlantic Concept of 
Data Privacy 
Erdem Büyüksagis* 
Due to ever-growing big data and the ease with which  
information can be transmitted over the Internet, it has become 
more complicated for individuals to enjoy their rights to access,  
to rectify and erase personal information, and for the judiciary  
to apply conventional privacy law rules, such as consent,  
transparency, and purpose limitation. On both sides of the Atlantic, 
this phenomenon has motivated legislatures and courts to extend 
protective measures in data privacy. Nevertheless, data protection 
standards in the United States and the European Union (“EU”)  
appear to many observers to be radically different and even  
mutually incompatible. The European Court of Justice’s ruling in 
Google Spain led many to assume that EU law gives more  
importance to data protection than does U.S. law. 
In this Article, I argue that the United States and the EU do in 
fact give similar levels of legal and regulatory protection to private 
data. Despite the Google Spain decision, the absence of an explicit 
reference to privacy or data protection in the U.S. Constitution, and 
cultural differences regarding the value placed on privacy between 
these jurisdictions, critics have not offered any convincing argu-
 
*  Full Professor of Law, Antalya Bilim University; Professor of Law, University of 
Fribourg. While writing this paper, I have been fortunate to benefit from a Fulbright grant, 
for which I am thankful. I owe a debt of gratitude to Professor Deborah Hensler for inviting 
me as a Fulbright Visiting Professor to Stanford Law School for a productive one-year 
sabbatical during the 2018–2019 academic period. The opportunities she provided 
throughout my stay at Stanford have meant a lot to me. I also thank Professor Dorothy 
Glancy of Santa Clara University Law School for her generous and insightful comments 
on a draft of this paper. Finally, I would like to thank Marta Infantino, Assistant Professor 
at the University of Trieste, for her help with the Italian sources, and Lotte Meurkens, 
Assistant Professor at Maastricht University, for her help with the Dutch sources.  
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ments to show that either the perception of privacy or the conse-
quences of its violation are radically different in the United States 
and in Europe. First, when assessing whether private data gathered  
by governments agencies or private businesses ought to be made 
available to the general public, courts in both jurisdictions take into  
account the nature of the information in question, its sensitivity for 
the data subject’s privacy, the data subject’s identity, the reasons 
behind the storage and disclosure of the information, and the  
public’s interest in the information. My point is illustrated by the 
fact that courts in the United States and the EU rely upon similar 
tests to deal with potential data breaches. Second, particularly since 
the adoption of the General Data Protection Regulation, data  
protection is on the agenda of a number of state legislatures in the 
United States. The adoption of the California Consumer Privacy Act 
constitutes a non-negligible shift in the nation’s data privacy  
regime, since its effective territorial reach will not be limited to  
California, but will involve all the states given as the headquarters 
of hundreds of high technology companies that are based in the  
region commonly known as “Silicon Valley.” 
My analysis leads me to the conclusion that the regulatory and 
case law developments on both sides of the Atlantic hint at a  
harmonization process of data protection standards because of the 
ever-growing recognition of the need for specific data protection 
laws and their substantive convergence. 
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In Oscar Wilde’s play “An Ideal Husband,” one of its characters, 
Mrs. Cheveley, asserts that no man is “rich enough . . . to buy back 
[his] past.”1 Wilde’s idea has continuing validity in our digital age, 
where information technology compresses time into a “perpetual”2 
present and creates a “digital panopticon.”3 This phenomenon, 
which puts private life no more than a few keystrokes away from 
 
1 OSCAR WILDE, AN IDEAL HUSBAND act 1, at 46 (The Floating Press 2008) (1895). 
2 Michael L. Rustad & Sanna Kulevska, Reconceptualizing the Right to Be Forgotten 
to Enable Transatlantic Data Flow, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 349, 416 (2015). 
3 VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER, DELETE: THE VIRTUE OF FORGETTING IN THE DIGITAL 
AGE 197 (2009) (referring to Bentham’s panopticon). A panopticon permits a watchman 
to watch occupants without the occupants knowing whether or not they are being observed. 
See The Panopticon, U.C. LONDON, https://www.ucl.ac.uk/bentham-project/who-was-
jeremy-bentham/panopticon [https://perma.cc/26QQ-7GCE]. 
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anyone connected to the global Internet, unavoidably shrinks the  
respect data controllers4 have for data subjects’ autonomy.5 
Data privacy issues arise, in general, from a mass violation of 
data subjects’ autonomy.6 Reflecting the large scale of this violation, 
litigation of this issue in the United States has tended to take the 
form of class-action lawsuits. The class-action lawsuits filed against 
 
4 According to the OECD Privacy Guidelines, a “data controller” is defined as the 
“party who, according to national law, is competent to decide about the contents and use 
of personal data regardless of whether or not such data are collected, stored, processed or 
disseminated by that party or by an agent on its behalf.” ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION 
AND DEV., THE OECD PRIVACY FRAMEWORK 13 (2013), www.oecd.org/sti/ 
ieconomy/oecd_privacy_framework.pdf [https://perma.cc/86TW-A83G]. 
5 According to the OECD Privacy Guidelines, a “data subject” is the natural person 
who is identified, or can be identified, by reference to her or his personal data. Id.  
6 James P. Nehf, Recognizing the Societal Value in Information Privacy, 78 WASH. L. 
REV. 1, 58 (2003) (discussing “holes in this patchwork of sector-specific privacy laws”). 
For a comparison with EU law, see PAUL B. LAMBERT, UNDERSTANDING THE NEW 
EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION RULES 12 (2018) (arguing that the “issue-by-issue 
approach . . . leaves many gaps and areas not covered by data protection in the United 
States”); Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of 
Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 586 (2014) (asserting that “[c]omparisons between 
privacy regulation in the United States and European Union have often pointed out E.U. 
law’s comprehensiveness in contrast with U.S. law’s fragmentation and hollow standards, 
which provide few limits on the collection, use, and disclosure of personal data”). 
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Facebook,7 Equifax,8 Target,9 Yahoo!,10 Home Depot,11 Sony Pic-
tures,12 Anthem,13 and Ashley Madison14 illustrate the problem of 
 
7 In March 2018, Facebook declared that the personal data of 87 million users 
worldwide had been collected through an app from November 2013 to May 2015 and 
transferred to Cambridge Analytica, a political consulting firm. Millions of users’ data was 
accessed and exploited, without the data subjects’ consent, to create politically useful 
profiling and micro-target citizens, giving campaign groups the ability to connect with 
individual voters. In January 2019, a complaint was filed with the Federal Trade 
Commission accusing Facebook of misleading practices. The plaintiffs alleged that 
personal health information about positive HIV diagnoses, sexual histories, details of past 
sexual abuse, substance abuse disorders, and a wide range of health and mental health 
conditions disclosed by users of closed Facebook groups had been made public. Sarah 
Tejares, FTC Accuses Facebook of Revealing Sensitive Health Data in Group, MED. DAILY 
(Feb. 19, 2019, 5:42 AM), www.medicaldaily.com/ftc-accuses-facebook-revealing-
sensitive-health-data-group-429927 [https://perma.cc/U4H9-E5XK]. 
8 Equifax, one of the nation’s largest credit reporting companies, has recently revealed 
a massive data breach that affected more than 148 million Americans. In its statements 
made in 2017 and 2018, the company reported that the names and dates of birth of 
approximately 147 million people were exposed, as well as 145.5 million Social Security 
numbers, the address information for 99 million people, the gender data for 27.3 million 
people, 20.3 million consumers’ phone numbers, 17.6 million driver’s license numbers, 1.8 
million email addresses, 209,000 credit card numbers and expiration dates, and 97,500 tax 
ID numbers. See Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, Equifax to Pay $575 Million 
as Part of Settlement with FTC, CFPB, and States Related to 2017 Data Breach (July 22, 2019), 
www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2019/07/equifax-pay-575-million-part-
settlement-ftc-cfpb-states-related [https://perma.cc/G9B6-7E8Z]. See also Thomas 
Brewster, Equifax Just Got Fined up to $700 Million for That Massive 2017 Hack, FORBES 
(July 22, 2019), www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2019/07/22/equifax-just-got-
fined-up-to-700-million-for-that-massive-2017-hack/#4c96c33c3e96 
[https://perma.cc/LRU3-PBQX]. 
9 Target failed to identify a subcontractor’s lax security and was thus the victim of a 
sophisticated hacking attack that resulted in 40 million customers’ debit and credit cards 
being exposed and 70 million customers’ nonfinancial personal information being stolen. 
See Rachel Abrams, Target to Pay $18.5 Million to 47 States in Security Breach Settlement, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/23/business/target-
security-breach-settlement.html [https://perma.cc/C2EG-VY5W]; Jonathan Stempel & 
Nandita Bose, Target in $39.4 Million Settlement with Banks over Data Breach, REUTERS 
(Dec. 2, 2015), www.reuters.com/article/us-targetbreach-settlement/target-in-39-4-million
-settlement-with-banks-over-data-breach-idUSKBN0TL20Y20151203 
[https://perma.cc/G5RM-7CXW]. 
10 In September 2016, Yahoo confirmed that it had experienced a huge data breach in 
late 2014 in which 500 million users’ PII, encrypted passwords, and in some cases security 
questions were hacked by a “state-sponsored actor.” Three months later, the company 
revealed another and even more important hack resulting in the data of over 1 billion users 
being compromised in August 2013. See Nicole Perlroth, Yahoo Says Hackers Stole Data 
on 500 Million Users in 2014, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2016), www.nytimes.com/2016/09/
23/technology/yahoo-hackers.html; [https://perma.cc/QED3-P8UB]; Vindu Goel & Nicole 
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data privacy protection, and explain why most people think that their 
personal privacy may gradually come to an end unless corrective 
 
Perlroth, Yahoo Says 1 Billion User Accounts Were Hacked, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/14/technology/yahoo-hack.html [https://perma.cc/
38J6-G2CQ]. 
11 In 2014, hackers used malware that infected the Home Depot payment systems and 
compromised 56 million customers. The hackers reportedly remained in the company’s 
computers, unnoticed, for about five months. See Melvin Blackman, Home Depot: 56 
Million Cards Exposed in Breach, CNN (Sept. 18, 2014), http://money.cnn.com/2014/
09/18/technology/security/home-depot-hack [https://perma.cc/FKZ7-NNRW]; Jonathan 
Stempel, Home Depot Settles Consumer Lawsuit over Big 2014 Data Breach, REUTERS 
(Mar. 8, 2016), www.reuters.com/article/us-home-depot-breachsettlement-idUSKCN0
WA24Z [https://perma.cc/9RDF-TQUK]. 
12 In 2014, entertainment company Sony experienced an extensive data breach that 
disclosed a huge amount of intellectual property and sensitive personal information. In the 
days following the public disclosure of the breach, the hackers started leaking yet-
unreleased films, unfinished manuscripts and eight portions of the estimated twenty-five 
gigabytes of sensitive or confidential data they had stolen. See David E. Sanger & Martin 
Fackler, N.S.A. Breached North Korean Networks Before Sony Attack, Officials Say, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 18, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/19/world/asia/nsa-tapped-into-
north-korean-networks-before-sony-attack-officials-say.html [https://perma.cc/PE8H-
2CYJ]; Jody Godoy, Sony to Pay up to $4.5M to Settle Employee’s Breach Suit, LAW360 
(Oct. 20, 2015), www.law360.com/articles/716417/sony-to-pay-up-to-4-5m-to-settle
employees-breach-suit [https://perma.cc/L9VN-NTWR] . 
13 Several massive hacks have been directed at the healthcare sector, a trend that is likely 
to go on given the high value of personal medical information. In 2015, for instance, close 
to 80 million personal records were stolen from Anthem, a large medical insurance 
company, as a result of questionable internal storage. See Joseph Conn, Legal Liabilities 
in Recent Data Breach Extend Far Beyond Anthem, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Feb. 23, 2015), 
https://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20150223/NEWS/302239977/legal-liabilities-
in-recent-data-breach-extend-far-beyond-anthem [https://perma.cc/4848-EDHA]; Bruce 
Japsen, Hackers Stole Data on 80 Million Anthem Customers. Why Wasn’t It Encrypted?, 
FORBES (Feb. 6, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/brucejapsen/2015/02/06/anthem-
didnt-encrypt-personal-data-and-privacy-laws-dont-require-it/#bdff22d4593e 
[https://perma.cc/YE54-WXLT]. 
14 An anonymous hacker group calling itself “The Impact Team” hacked into the online 
cheating website and menaced to release the stolen information unless the owners 
permanently shut down the site. As the website owners refused, the hackers uploaded 
around thirty gigabytes of stolen data onto the dark web, thus exposing the personal account 
information of the site’s users, as well as data about the company and its employees. See 
Chris Baraniuk, Ashley Madison: ‘Suicides’ over Website Hack, BBC (Aug. 24, 2015), 
www.bbc.com/news/technology-34044506 [https://perma.cc/ZPJ9-FP7K]; Brian Krebs, 
Online Cheating Site Ashley Madison Hacked, KREBS ON SECURITY (July 15, 2015), 
http://krebsonsecurity.com/2015/07/online-cheating-site-ashleymadison-hacked 
[https://perma.cc/34TU-BC82]; Kim Zetter, Ashley Madison Hackers Release an Even 
Bigger Batch of Data, WIRED (Aug. 20, 2015, 3:01 PM), https://www.wired.com/2015/08/
ashley-madison-hackers-release-even-bigger-batch-data/ [https://perma.cc/6A5P-9KVY]. 
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actions are taken. Some individual15 as well as class actions16 
brought against Google on privacy and data security related issues 
in the European Union (“EU”) reflect similar concerns regarding 
data consent policies that do not give users enough control over the 
way their information is collected and processed. 
The growing concern has prompted lawmakers on both sides  
of the Atlantic to introduce new laws and proposals to address 
threats to privacy and data security. The EU legislature replaced  
the 1995 Data Protection Directive with the General Data Protection 
Regulation (“GDPR”),17 and unified data protection within the 
EU.18 Article 3 of the GDPR reads that the Regulation applies to 
“the processing of personal data in the context of the activities of an 
establishment of a controller or a processor in the [European] Union, 
regardless of whether the processing takes place in the [European] 
Union or not.”19 This centralized approach significantly lessened  
the burden on information technology businesses, since they no 
longer have to comply with the various sensitivities of each EU 
member state.20  
In the United States, some legislative efforts at the state level, 
like the newly adopted California Consumer Privacy Act (“CCPA”), 
aim at strengthening consumers’ privacy rights in a limited  
geographical area,21 whereas a diverse collection of different types 
 
15 See, e.g., Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de 
Datos, 2014 E.C.R. 317. 
16 Following the fine imposed by France’s data watchdog on Google for failing to 
implement adequate measures to meet the requirements of the GDPR, in June 2019, a 
French consumer group filed a class-action against Google for improper collection of 
location tracking data. See French Consumer Group Files Class-Action Against Google for 
Alleged GDPR Violations, IAPP (June 27, 2019), https://iapp.org/news/a/french-
consumer-group-files-class-action-against-google-for-alleged-gdpr-violations/ 
[https://perma.cc/6TS6-EPX7]. 
17 Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 
on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and 
on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data 
Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 [hereinafter GDPR]. 
18 LAMBERT, supra note 6, at 12. 
19 GDPR, supra note 17, art. 3. 
20 Lisa Owings, The Right to Be Forgotten, 9 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 45, 62 (2015). 
21 California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.198(a) (2018). For 
an analysis see Lydia de la Torre, A Guide to the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, 
SANTA CLARA U., https://ssrn.com/abstract=3275571 [https://perma.cc/8ZJ4-URCM]; Eric 
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of rules govern privacy and data protection at the national level.22  
Obviously, some sensibilities about privacy differ between the 
United States, with its solid free-speech tradition,23 and Europe, with 
its painful experience of Nazi propaganda.24 The different attitudes 
towards privacy lead, in turn, to diverse legislative schemes impact-
ing the method of protection.25 Although there have been some  
signs of change,26 the data protection policy of the United States  
 
Goldman, An Introduction to the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), IAPP (July 9, 
2018), https://iapp.org/media/pdf/resource_center/Intro_to_CCPA.pdf [https://perma.cc/
VR8N-H9X3]. 
22 On these rules, see Dorothy J. Glancy, At the Intersection of Visible and Invisible 
Worlds: United States Privacy Law and the Internet, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUT. & HIGH 
TECH. L.J. 357, 359 (2000); 37th Int’l Privacy Conference Amsterdam 2015, Privacy 
Bridges, EU AND US PRIVACY EXPERTS IN SEARCH OF TRANSATLANTIC PRIVACY SOLUTIONS 
16–17 (2015), https://privacybridges.mit.edu/sites/default/files/documents/Privacy 
Bridges-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/4UPA-JLUP] [hereinafter Privacy Bridges]; 
Cameron F. Kerry, Filling the Gaps in US Data Privacy Laws, BROOKINGS INST. (July 12, 
2018), www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2018/07/12/filling-the-gaps-in-u-s-data-privacy
-laws [https://perma.cc/9XCM-BYHC]. It is worth noting that a number of state 
constitutions, namely those of Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, 
Louisiana, Montana, New Hampshire, South Carolina, and Washington, expressly provide 
for a right to information privacy. See Privacy Protections in State Constitutions, NAT’L 
CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Nov. 7, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecom
munications-and-information-technology/privacy-protections-in-state-constitutions.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/N3H5-9R7Q]. 
23 Glancy, supra note 22, at 355–66; Jean-Marie Kamatali, The Limits of the First 
Amendment: Protecting American Citizens’ Free Speech in the Era of the Internet & the 
Global Marketplace of Ideas, 33 WIS. INT’L L.J. 101, 130 (2016). 
24 Tracie B. Loring, An Analysis of the Informational Privacy Protection Afforded by the 
European Union and the United States, 37 TEX. INT’L L.J. 421, 423 (2002); see also 
JACQUELINE KLOSEK, THE WAR ON PRIVACY 78 (2007) (noting that “[i]n the years 
following World War II, in light of the horrors raised by the holocaust, governments were 
sensitive to the importance of respecting their citizens’ right to maintain the privacy of 
certain personal information”); Michael W. Heydrich, A Brave New World: Complying 
with the European Union Directive on Personal Privacy Through the Power of Contract, 
25 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 407, 417 (1999). 
25 See James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy, Dignity Versus Liberty, 
113(6) YALE L.J. 1151, 1155 (2004) (The author argues that “[t]o the Europeans . . . it often 
seems obvious that Americans do not understand the imperative demands of privacy at all.” 
He thinks that “[t]he Monica Lewinsky investigation, in particular, with its numerous and 
lewd disclosures, led many Europeans to that conclusion.”). 
26 See infra Part III.A. 
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remains market-dominated, whereas the EU prefers a rights- 
dominated approach.27 
On the basis of multiple differences, several commentators have 
noted that the United States and the EU have conflicting data pro-
tection standards.28 The type of protection radically changes as data 
crosses the Atlantic. The obligations of the users and disseminators 
of data, both of which are primarily multinational corporations, 
change as well. The recent invalidation of the US–EU Safe Harbor 
Agreement,29 which aimed at providing protection for the transfer 
of individuals’ personal data from EU member states to organiza-
tions in the United States, might have contributed to creating that 
perception of conflict.30 The landmark Google Spain decision 
handed down by the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”)31 in 2014 
certainly reinforced the idea that EU law gives more importance to 
data protection than American law,32 although EU law does have a 
 
27 Joel R. Reidenberg, Resolving Conflicting International Data Privacy Rules in 
Cyberspace, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1318 (1999). 
28 See, e.g., Leslie E. Minora, U.S. Courts Should Not Let Europe’s “Right to Be 
Forgotten” Force the World to Forget, 89 TEMPLE L. REV. 609, 642 (2017) (arguing that 
“if and when a U.S. court faces [a right to be forgotten enforcement] decision, it should not 
enforce the right to be forgotten because it contravenes our First Amendment”). 
29 Commission Decision 2000/520 of 26 July 2000 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council on the Adequacy of the Protection Provided 
by the Safe Harbour Privacy Principles and Related Frequently Asked Questions Issued by 
the U.S. Department of Commerce, 2000 O.J. (L 215) 8. 
30 The US–EU Safe Harbor Agreement was heavily criticized in the United States. See 
David Raj Nijhawan, The Emperor Has No Clothes: A Critique of Applying the European 
Union Approach to Privacy Regulation in the United States, 56 VAND. L. REV. 939, 958 
(2003) (arguing that “certification under Safe Harbor . . . face[s] strict constitutional 
challenges—for example, under the First Amendment principle of free flow of 
information”). 
31 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos, 2014 
E.C.R. 317. 
32 LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST 
SPEECH IN AMERICA 7 (1986) (stating that “the free speech idea nonetheless remains one of 
our foremost cultural symbols”); Frederick Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, in 
ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 175, 176 (Lee C. Bollinger & 
Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002) (arguing that “different societies have different 
argumentative showstoppers, but in the United States it is often the First Amendment that 
serves this function”); Michael L. Rustad & Sanna Kulevska, Reconceptualizing the Right 
to Be Forgotten to Enable Transatlantic Data Flow, 28 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 349, 416 (2015) 
(highlighting that “the difference in approaches to privacy rights can be attributed to 
America’s unilateral protection of the freedoms of expression and the press under the First 
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doctrine that echoes the First Amendment right of freedom of ex-
pression.33 Many describe the scrutiny levels applied to public dis-
closure of private facts in the United States and the EU as a “trans-
atlantic clash.”34 Dean Post takes a step further and argues that 
Google Spain “forays into the significance of communication on the 
Internet.”35 According to another commentator, Professor Byrum, 
this situation has the potential of “unearth[ing] a myriad of global 
media law issues between the two continents.”36 A senior research 
fellow at Heritage Foundation adopts an extreme position and con-
siders the GDPR a form of “imperialism” permitting the EU to ag-
gressively assert jurisdiction over U.S. companies.37 
 
Amendment and Europe’s recognition of the countervailing right to private life in Article 
8 of the ECHR”); Howard M. Wasserman, Symbolic Counter-Speech, 12 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 367, 380 (2004) (describing the principle of freedom of speech as an “icon”). 
33 Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU reads: “Everyone has the 
right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to 
receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and 
regardless of frontiers.” Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 11(1), 
2012 O.J. (C 326/391) 398. 
34 Franz Werro, The Right to Inform v. The Right to Be Forgotten: A Transatlantic Clash, 
in LIABILITY IN THE THIRD MILLENNIUM 285 (Aurelia Colombi Ciacchi et al. eds., 2009); 
see also Andrew Charlesworth, Clash of the Data Titans? US and EU Data Privacy 
Regulation, 6 EUR. PUB. L. 253 (2000); Paul M. Schwartz, The EU-U.S. Privacy Collision: 
A Turn to Institutions and Procedures, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1966, 1976 (2013); Larry 
Downes, GDPR and the End of the Internet’s Grand Bargain, HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 9, 
2018), https://hbr.org/2018/04/gdpr-and-the-end-of-the-internets-grand-bargain 
[https://perma.cc/2CZP-BN7B]. 
35 See Robert C. Post, Data Privacy and Dignitary Privacy: Google Spain, the Right to 
Be Forgotten, and the Construction of the Public Sphere, 67 DUKE L.J. 981, 1071 (2018). 
36 KRISTIE BYRUM, THE EUROPEAN RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
ENEMY xiii (2018); see also Jeffrey Rosen, The Right to Be Forgotten, ATLANTIC 
(July/Aug. 2012), www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/07/the-right-to-be-
forgotten/309044/ [https://perma. cc/RV4F-8WVC]. 
37 Theodore Bromund, The U.S. Must Draw a Line on the EU’s Data-Protection 
Imperialism, HERITAGE FOUND. (Jan. 9, 2018), https://www.heritage.org/government-
regulation/report/the-us-must-draw-line-the-eus-data-protection-imperialism 
[https://perma.cc/QEL3-MG25]. However, when it comes to the right to be forgotten, for 
instance, which is to be found in Article 17 of the GDPR, in its decision of September 24, 
2019, the ECJ highlighted that “where a search engine operator grants a request for de-
referencing . . . , that operator is not required to carry out that de-referencing on all versions 
of its search engine, but on the versions of that search engine corresponding to all the [EU] 
Member States, using, where necessary, measures which, while meeting the legal 
requirements, effectively prevent or, at the very least, seriously discourage an internet user 
conducting a search from one of the Member States on the basis of a data subject’s name 
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The analysis set forth in this Article shows that, despite the dif-
ferent values that American and European cultures attach to privacy, 
the United States and EU legal and regulatory regimes define data 
privacy in similar ways and impose similar consequences on those 
who violate data protections. First, any attempt at comparison be-
tween the American and EU systems based upon a generalization 
from just one case—as if these systems were monolithic and 
standalone—is inaccurate and simplistic. In the EU, even if Google 
Spain sets a milestone in the long-standing struggle to find a fair 
solution to data protection issues, it is not the only ECJ ruling that 
governs digital privacy. Likewise, “privacy” is not a fixed concept 
across all American jurisprudence, and American courts have devel-
oped a range of robust standards with which to assess different kinds 
of data privacy violations.38 Professor Glancy rightly contradicts the 
beliefs of some39 when, discussing data privacy law in the United 
States, she points out that “it [would be] a mistake to count privacy, 
and the laws which protect it, as zero.”40 
In parallel with global changes in the ways data is preserved and 
protected,41 both the EU legislature and many American state legis-
latures have gained greater appreciation for the importance of data 
protection and have expanded the scope of data regulation. In fact, 
several states have already adopted, or are about to adopt, some of 
 
from gaining access, via the list of results displayed following that search, to the links 
which are the subject of that request.” See Case C‑507/17, Google LLC v. Commission 
nationale de l’informatique et des libertés (CNIL), 2019 E.C.R. 772, ¶ 73 (Sept. 24, 2019). 
38 See generally Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PENN. L. REV. 477 
(2006). 
39 While responding to a question at a product launch Scott McNealy (CEO of Sun 
Microsystems) said, “You have zero privacy. Get over it.” See Michael Froomkin, The 
Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1463 (2000); Glancy, supra note 22, at 357 
(2000) (both Froomkin and Glancy referring to what Scott McNealy said). McNealy’s Sun 
Microsystems was a causality of the dot-com bubble. 
40 Glancy, supra note 22, at 358. 
41 According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 
“107 countries (of which 66 were developing or transition economies) have put in place 
legislation to secure the protection of data and privacy.” Data Protection and Privacy 
Legislation Worldwide, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., 
https://unctad.org/en/Pages/DTL/STI_and_ICTs/ICT4D-Legislation/eCom-Data-
Protection-Laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/48VL-YEQV]. See also Graham Greenleaf, 
Global Data Privacy Laws 2017: 120 National Data Privacy Laws, Including Indonesia 
and Turkey, 145 PRIVACY LAWS & BUS. INT’L REP. 10 (2017). 
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the protective measures found in the GDPR.42 The CCPA, which 
gives consumers, among others, a right to request that a business 
delete any personal information that it has collected from its con-
sumers,43 or the legislative proposals recently introduced by a bipar-
tisan group of lawmakers to adopt a strong, national privacy policy 
foretell the direction in which the protection of privacy and personal 
information is heading in the United States.44 
The purpose of this study is neither to find a concept that could 
reconcile privacy with freedom of expression nor to provide a  
thorough description of data privacy laws in the United States and 
the EU. Rather, this study aims to demonstrate, from both practical 
and conceptual perspectives, that a multitude of variables influence 
any decision regarding a possible loss of privacy or restriction of 
freedom of expression. This Article will start by highlighting gaps 
in privacy and data protection at various levels, and these gaps’  
dramatic consequences for both individuals and businesses in the 
computerized world of the 21st century (II). This Article will then 
explain the dynamics of current legislative activities in the United 
States and the EU with reference to the debate on privacy in general 
and data protection in particular. This section of the Article will  
introduce the parallels between some factors driving the new  
privacy policy in both the United States and the EU, although  
the former sees privacy as in essence a civil right and the latter con-
siders it to be a natural right (III).45 This Article will then discuss the 
 
42 Rachel Marmor, Maryam Casbarro & Mike Khoury, “Copycat CCPA” Bills Introduced 
in States Across Country, DAVIS WRIGHT & TREMAINE LLP (Feb. 7, 2019) 
https://www.dwt.com/insights/2019/02/copycat-ccpa-bills-introduced-in-states-across-
cou [https://perma.cc/4NTC-HWL3]. 
43 See California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.105(a) (2018) 
(“A consumer shall have the right to request that a business delete any personal information 
about the consumer which the business has collected from the consumer.”). 
44 Policy Principles for a Federal Data Privacy Framework in the United States: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 116th Cong. 2 
(2019) (statement of Sen. Roger Wicker, Chairman, the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science 
and Transportation). 
45 Human rights are natural rights usually granted by the Constitution, held against the 
powers of the state, whereas civil rights are usually granted by state laws. This distinction 
is less important in Europe. For more information on this discussion, see Steven C. Bennett, 
The “Right to Be Forgotten:” Reconciling EU and US Perspectives, 30 BERKELEY J. INT’L 
L. 161, 168 (2012). 
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standards and tests that American and European courts respectively 
use to evaluate data protection (IV). Finally, this Article will indi-
cate how such in-depth case-based study may be used not only to 
facilitate further legal analysis of the sprawling and complex notion 
of data protection, but also to show that courts on both sides of the  
Atlantic use fundamentally similar criteria to adjudicate data  
protection disputes. 
I. NECESSITY OF MORE EFFECTIVE MEASURES 
This section will discuss the necessity of more effective 
measures from the point of view of the protection of privacy in  
general and data protection in particular. I will first define what  
privacy means today, then focus on the methods that have been used 
to remedy privacy breaches or data misuse, and finally highlight  
the need, in an evolving technological landscape, for new ways of 
legal thinking.  
A. Ineffectiveness of Existing Privacy Norms 
The U.S. Constitution does not explicitly mention privacy or 
data protection, although the U.S. Supreme Court has found that the 
Constitution implicitly guarantees a fundamental right to privacy.46 
Privacy includes the protection of an individual’s “private space.”47 
As Garfinkel described in his book, Database Nation, “privacy [nev-
ertheless] isn’t just about hiding things. It’s about self-possession, 
autonomy and integrity”48 or, in the words of the Supreme Court, an 
“individual’s control of information concerning his or her person.”49 
This description is in line with Warren’s and Brandeis’ original 
thinking that the right to privacy was the right of each individual to 
 
46 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (asserting for the first time an 
independent constitutional right of privacy, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional the 
Connecticut birth control statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives by married couples). 
47 See Privacy Bridges, supra note 22, at 12. 
48 SIMSON GARFINKEL, DATABASE NATION: THE DEATH OF PRIVACY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 
4–5 (2000). 
49 Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 763 
(1989). 
152           FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.      [Vol. XXX:139 
 
determine, “ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and 
emotions shall be communicated to others.”50 
The definition above reflects the traditional American concep-
tion of self-reliance, based on Emerson, Thoreau, Dickinson, and 
many other nineteenth century American writers.51 Yet it is not very 
different form the European conception of privacy. Already in the 
seventeenth century, John Locke, one of the most influential Euro-
pean Enlightenment thinkers, had recognized the law of reputation 
is a necessary restraint to balance the desire for liberty.52 Locke’s 
insight influenced the notion of freedom proclaimed in Article 2  
of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen  
(“Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen de 1789”), which  
implicitly articulates respect for privacy.53 The ECJ’s analytical  
approach in Google Spain might be traced back to the  
French Revolution.54 
Today, both the European Convention on Human Rights55 and 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights56 provide similar definitions to 
those found in court opinions in the United States. Article 8 of the 
Convention and similarly Article 7 of the Charter state that everyone 
has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home, 
and communications. In Evans, the European Court of Human 
 
50 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 
198 (1890). 
51 Dorothy J. Glancy, The Invention of the Right to Privacy, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 25 
(1979) [hereinafter Invention]. 
52 JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, available at 
https://www.globalgreyebooks.com/read-online/essay-concerning-human-understanding/
read-online.html#_Toc530974960 [https://perma.cc/6RF4-7K9H] (1690). See also 
Michelle E. Brady, Locke’s Thoughts on Reputation, 75 REV. POL. 335 (2013). 
53 See Judgment of June 16, 1858, Trib. pr. inst. de la Seine, 1858 D.P. III 62 (Fr.) 
(affaire Rachel) (the landmark Rachel decision handed down by the First Instance of Sarine 
Court, where the tort of privacy was first recognized in 1858). For the details of this case 
see Jeanne M. Hauch, Protecting Private Facts in France: The Warren and Brandeis Tort 
Is Alive and Well and Flourishing in Paris, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1219, 1233 (1994). 
54 BYRUM, supra note 36, at xiv. 
55 EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EUROPEAN CONVENTION 
ON HUMAN RIGHTS (June 1, 2010), www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf. 
[https://perma.cc/5MRF-FUFJ] [hereinafter ECHR]. 
56 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2012 O.J. (C 326/393) 391. 
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Rights (“ECtHR”) described, on the basis of Article 8 of the Con-
vention, the “protect[tion] against interference with private life [as] 
an aspect of the principle of self-determination or personal auton-
omy.”57 The latter was described in a similar way by the California 
Supreme Court as an interest “in making intimate personal decisions 
or conducting personal activities without observation, intrusion, or 
interference . . . .”58 On both sides of the Atlantic, courts have 
adopted a wide-ranging interpretation of “private life.”59 
The right to digital self-determination or privacy is the logical 
reaction to countless privacy breaches,60 and accordingly this right 
has become one of the most discussed and popular topics in the legal 
world.61 When Warren and Brandeis published their paper on pri-
vacy in 1890, immigration was driving rapid population growth in 
the United States, with the result that life in many local communities 
was becoming less isolated and the cities were becoming more 
crowded.62 In this context, personal privacy became much more dif-
ficult to attain or preserve.63 Personal privacy was still in need of 
support and protection in 1970, when, under the theory of “captive 
audience,” the Supreme Court in Rowan rejected a First Amendment 
challenge to a statute enabling people to refuse the Post Office per-
mission to deliver mail from specific senders to their homes.64 To-
 
57 Evans v. United Kingdom, App. No. 633/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 7 (2007). 
58 Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 865 P.2d 633, 654 (Cal. 1994). 
59 Michael C. James, A Comparative Analysis of the Right to Privacy in the United 
States, Canada and Europe, 29 CONN. J. INT’L L. 257, 276 (2014). 
60 On the contemporary conception of privacy, see AMITAI ETZIONI, THE LIMITS OF 
PRIVACY 183 (1999). For an overview, see generally M. Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of 
Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J. 1131 (2011); Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 
YALE L.J. 421 (1980); Richard A. Posner, Privacy, Surveillance, and Law, 75 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 245 (2008); Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PENN. L. REV. 477 
(2006). On the evolution of the right to privacy, see Invention, supra note 51. 
61 Colin J. Bennett, The European General Data Protection Regulation: An Instrument 
for the Globalization of Privacy Standards?, 23 INFO. POLITY 239, 239 (2018) (saying that 
“[a]t no time in the past 40 years, has the protection of privacy been so prominently, 
globally and intensively debated”). 
62 OSCAR HANDLIN, IMMIGRATION AS A FACTOR IN AMERICAN HISTORY 1–2 (1959). 
63 Edwin L. Godkin, The Rights of the Citizen, SCRIBNER’S MAG., July 1890, at 62. 
64 Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970) (“We . . . categorically 
reject the argument that a vendor has a right under the Constitution or otherwise to send 
unwanted material into the home of another . . . . That we are often ‘captives’ outside the 
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day, the primary threat to individual privacy is the (mis)use of tech-
nology that permits private businesses and government agencies to 
have access to data about people’s personal lives. 
Over the last two decades, millions of Internet users have begun 
to surf the web and use commercial online services that cater to their 
needs for communication, information, and entertainment.65 Internet 
users’ personal information, especially consumer characteristics 
such as their earning level, address, and credit card use, is collected, 
processed and monetized without the individual’s consent or even 
knowledge.66 Many providers of online services record users’ search 
history, browsing habits, shopping preferences, geolocation data,67 
health and genetic profiles, and even information about their feel-
ings.68 Indeed, Google confirms this practice in its privacy policy: 
“We collect information to provide better services to all of our us-
ers—from figuring out basic stuff like which language you speak, to 
more complex things like which ads you’ll find most useful, the peo-
ple who matter most to you online, or which YouTube videos you 
might like.”69 
 
sanctuary of the home and subject to objectionable speech and other sound does not mean 
we must be captives everywhere . . . . The asserted right of a mailer, we repeat, stops at the 
outer boundary of every person’s domain.”). 
65 In 2015 it was estimated that there were over 3 billion Internet users worldwide. See 
Privacy Bridges, supra note 22, at 10. 
66 CEES J. HAMELINK, THE ETHICS OF CYBERSPACE 12 (2000) (arguing that “information 
itself becomes a commodity tradable on a global scale”). For an illustration, see Internet 
Advertising Revenue Report, IAB (Apr. 2016), www.iab.com/wp-content/uploads/
2016/04/IAB_Internet_Advertising_Revenue_Report_FY_2015-final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/28TH-TAYA]. 
67 Geolocation privacy has recently come into question in cases where “connected 
vehicles affect personal information privacy interests, primarily through misuse of personal 
data about individual people.” See Dorothy Glancy, Sharing the Road: Smart 
Transportation Infrastructure, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1617, 1657–58 (2014) (highlighting 
that “a connected vehicle seems likely to be considered comparable to a cell phone”). 
68 Roberto Alberdeston, Erich Dondyk & Cliff C. Zou, Click-Tracking Blocker: Privacy 
Preservation by Disabling Search Engines’ Click-Tracking, U. CENT. FLA. 2 (2014), 
www.cs.ucf.edu/~czou/research/clickTrackBlocker-globecom14.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
336H-6ZGT]. 
69 See Privacy Policy, GOOGLE, www.google.com/policies/privacy [https://perma.cc/
QL46-FZEB]. 
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On the other hand, the validity of the consents obtained by multi-
page end-user license agreements is questionable. It is hardly con-
ceivable that silence, pre-ticked boxes, or inactivity could constitute 
valid consent.70 On January 21, 2019, the Commission Nationale de 
l’Informatique et des Libertés (“CNIL”), France’s data watchdog, 
imposed a record €50 million fine (approximately $55 million) on 
Google for having failed to implement adequate measures to meet 
the requirements of the GDPR.71 The Commission ruled that Google 
did not provide enough information to users about its data consent 
policies and did not give them enough control over the way their 
information is used.72 
According to surveys, people who experience such threats to 
their privacy develop a higher awareness of the value of their per-
sonal information.73 Privacy matters to society at large because it 
contributes to the “building and maintaining of relationships and the 
support of a more just, democratic, and tolerant society.”74 Accord-
ing to an interdisciplinary study, privacy includes protection from 
the overreach of social interaction; affirmation of self-ownership, 
 
70 GDPR, supra note 17, recital 32 (“Consent should be given by a clear affirmative act 
establishing a freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data 
subject’s agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her . . . . Silence, 
pre-ticked boxes or inactivity should not therefore constitute consent.”). In this vein, see 
also the recent decision handed down by the ECJ on October 1, 2019 in Case C-673/17, 
Planet49 GmbH v. Bundesverband der Verbraucherzentralen und Verbraucherverbände—
Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband e.V. 2019 E.C.R. 801, ¶¶ 49, 65 (Oct. 1, 2019) 
(holding that the consent which a website user must give to the storage of and access to 
cookies on his or her equipment is not validly constituted by way of a pre-checked 
checkbox. Thus, the user must actively submit her or his approval for cookie storage). 
71 See Deliberation of the Restricted Committee SAN–2019–001 of 21 January 2019 
Pronouncing a Financial Sanction Against Google LLC, CNIL 3 (2019), 
https://www.cnil.fr/sites/default/files/atoms/files/san-2019-001.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7USD-DVTS]. 
72 Id. at 15–24. 
73 A recent survey indicates that eight out of ten Americans have concerns about the 
privacy of their financial and personal records. See Nearly Half of Americans Say ID Theft 
Likely to Cause Them Financial Loss in the Next Year: AICPA Survey, ASS’N INT’L 
CERTIFIED PUB. ACCT. (Apr. 3, 2018), www.aicpa.org/press/pressreleases/2018/nearly-
half-of-americans-say-id-theft-likely-to-cause-them-finan.html [https://perma.cc/JPE8-
YTRP]. 
74 Trina J. Magi, Fourteen Reasons Privacy Matters: A Multidisciplinary Review of 
Scholarly Literature, 81 LIBR. Q. 187, 206 (2011). 
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moral agency, and freedom of choice; prevention against the victim-
ization of people through categorization and being misjudged out of 
context; and the possibility for an individual to make a fresh start.75 
A “fresh start” is nevertheless getting more and more difficult. 
Through data matching, data mining, and de-anonymization, tech-
nology leads to the creation of potentially massive “digital dossiers.” 
The problem is that most people lack the legal tools allowing them 
to monitor and protect their personal information, or to cost-effec-
tively redress the privacy breaches when they occur.76 The usual mi-
nor efforts people make to defend their privacy online are often un-
successful or rather effortlessly by-passed.77 Given these develop-
ments, fairness seems more clearly than ever to dictate against plac-
ing the burden of privacy protection solely on the data subject. 
In April 2015, a 31-year-old woman from Naples, Italy used 
WhatsApp to send a series of sex videos to five people, including 
her boyfriend.78 In these videos she can be seen, in a drunken state, 
performing sex acts with various unidentified men. The videos were 
soon shared and uploaded onto several adult websites. However, this 
woman was subjected to more than voyeurism. She unwillingly  
became a notorious figure as her picture appeared on t-shirts, as 
websites parodied her, and as she was called shameful names. She 
decided to put up a fight. After unsuccessfully struggling for months 
to have the videos removed from the Internet, she went to court,  
arguing that the videos had been uploaded onto public websites 
without her consent.79 By that time, she was no longer able to live a 
 
75 Id. 
76 Rodney A. Smolla, Privacy and the First Amendment Right to Gather News, 67 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1097, 1100 (1999) (highlighting that “these may be the worst of times for 
privacy, in that there appears to be so little of it. Yet these may also be the best of times, 
because the collective sense that privacy is being lost appears to be generating a cultural 
backlash”). 
77 J.J. Sylvia IV, Little Brother: How Big Data Necessitates an Ethical Shift from 
Privacy to Power, in CONTROVERSIES IN DIGITAL ETHICS 13, 26 (Amber Davisson & Paul 
Booth eds., 2016) (pointing out that “big data-driven decision-making is able to sway easily 
the population at large without their having realized it”); Roger Clarke, Internet Privacy 
Concerns Confirm the Case for Intervention, 42 COMM. ACM 60 (1999). 
78 James Reynolds, Italy’s Tiziana: Tragedy of a Woman Destroyed by Viral Sex Videos, 
BBC (Feb. 13, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38848528 
[https://perma.cc/FJ5Y-8QYL]. 
79 Id.; see also Tribunal of Naples (Nord), November 3, 2016, in Diritto dell’Informazione 
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normal life. On September 7, 2016, a Neapolitan court ordered  
the sex videos to be removed from various websites and search  
engines.80 However, the court also ordered her to pay €20,000 
($22,700) in legal costs, which was all too much for her, especially 
as she had only a modest income.81 Here are the words of her mother 
who, on September 13, 2016, had gone to work at the local town hall 
while her daughter stayed home: “My sister-in-law called me, and 
in a calm voice told me to come home; when I got here I saw the 
police, the ambulance, and I quickly understood. My sister-in-law 
tried to pick her up and save her. My neighbors didn’t allow me to 
get out of my car. I almost fainted. They didn’t want to let me into 
this house. I wasn’t even able to see her for a last time. The day she 
died, my life ended.”82 
This happened in Europe, but such tragic events where the  
ongoing public availability of accurate information about an identi-
fiable person leads to significant injustice without sufficient  
countervailing public benefits are happening everywhere, and  
often at mass level, with increasing regularity. The 2014 hacking of 
the online accounts of several celebrities, including Oscar winner  
Jennifer Lawrence, leading to the posting of their nude photographs 
online, is one of the numerous examples that happened in the  
United States.83 
Although those are not without criticisms or reservations,84 
many methods have been used in the United States to remedy  
 
e dell’Informatica 243 (2017) (commented by Matteo Montanari). 
80 Reynolds, supra note 78. Before the final decision, the court ordered the websites to 
remove the videos on September 7, 2016. Id. 
81 Id. 
82 For more information on this case, see UMBERTO AMBROSOLI & MASSIMO SIDERI, 
DIRITTO ALL’OBLIO, DOVERE DELLA MEMORIA 1 (2017). 
83 Ellie Davis, Jennifer Lawrence on Dealing with Her Nude Photo Leak, VOGUE  
(Nov. 21, 2017), www.vogue.co.uk/article/jennifer-lawrence-apple-hack-nude-images 
[https://perma.cc/2JBH-3NX9]. 
84 For criticisms or reservations see, e.g., William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 
383, 400–01 (1960) (arguing that “the privacy cases do go considerably beyond the narrow 
limits of defamation, and no doubt have succeeded in affording a needed remedy in a good 
many instances not covered by the other tort.” He concludes that “it is here, however, that 
one disposed to alarm might express the greatest concern over where privacy may be 
going”). 
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privacy breaches or data misuse85 since Warren and Brandeis drew 
attention in 1890 to the necessity to set up protection against  
invasion of privacy. They argued that “inventions and business 
methods call attention to the next step which must be taken for the 
protection of the person, and for securing to the individual . . . the 
right ‘to be let alone.’”86 
Today, individual privacy is governed by constitutional provi-
sions, federal and state statutes, regulations, and voluntary industry 
guidelines of practice that apply to the public and private sectors in 
different ways.87 Plaintiffs seeking to vindicate privacy rights 
through litigation can select their causes of action from a range of 
tort claims.88 Defamation creates a cause of action to protect one’s 
reputation from false claims.89 Intrusion upon seclusion creates a 
cause of action to protect one from the intentional invasion into a 
person’s solitude or private area through, for instance, “eavesdrop-
ping, peeping through windows or surreptitiously opening another’s 
mail.”90 Public disclosure of private facts is a cause of action against 
one that disseminates generally unknown private information, even 
if it is true.91 A plaintiff may sue for misappropriation, which is  
using another’s name, likeness, or other personal attributes without 
permission for exploitative purposes.92 In some states, a plaintiff can 
bring a claim for false light if a defendant publishes information that 
places the subject in a highly offensive light.93 As Professor 
Schwartz noted, “in a defamation action, the plaintiff complains that 
 
85 Solove, supra note 60, at 77; Ieuan Jolly, Data Protection in the United States: 
Overview, PRAC. L., http://us.practicallaw.com/6-5020467 [https://perma.cc/3NLZ-
UPV7]. 
86 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 50, at 195. 
87 Domingo R. Tan, Personal Privacy in the Information Age: Comparison of Internet 
Data Protection Regulations in the United States and the European Union, 21 LOY. L.A. 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 661, 668 (1999). 
88 Joseph A. Page, American Tort Law and the Right to Privacy, in PERSONALITY RIGHTS 
IN EUROPEAN TORT LAW 38 (Gert Brüggemeier, Aurelia Colombi Ciacchi & Patrick 
O’Callaghan eds., 2010). 
89 3 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 23:6 (2019). 
90 Id. § 24:6. 
91 Id. § 24:5. 
92 Id. § 24:4. 
93 Id. § 24:3. 
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the defendant’s statement has diminished his reputation; the state-
ment’s falsity comes in by showing that this diminution is not justi-
fied. In a false light action, the defendant’s falsehood brings about a 
mismatch or conflict between the plaintiff’s actual identity and his 
identity in the minds of others, a conflict that itself can be offensive 
or disorienting.”94 
Intellectual property laws provide another mechanism to  
regulate information flows, and to mediate, problematize, or resolve 
tensions that may arise between freedom of speech and privacy. To 
take the fight against revenge porn in the United States as an  
example, copyright law can favor either the perpetrator or the  
victim, depending on the facts.95 Copyright law compounds the  
violation of the victim’s privacy if the perpetrator has photographed 
or filmed the images and therefore owns the right to distribute and 
reproduce them.96 On the other hand, copyright law equips the  
victim with a powerful tool to fight back against the perpetrator if, 
as is often the case, the victim was the one who recorded the images 
and thus owns the distribution and reproduction rights.97 
In the EU, too, there are several ways to resolve the inherent 
conflict between copyright and freedom of expression.98 The ECJ 
has recently been questioned by the German Supreme Court as to 
whether, in the absence of an applicable copyright exception,  
fundamental rights like freedom of expression and freedom of infor-
mation should permit the disclosure or unauthorized use of military 
reports that have been distributed to selected members of the Parlia-
ment as “classified documents.”99 In its decision handed down on 
 
94 Gary T. Schwartz, Explaining and Justifying a Limited Tort of False Light Invasion 
of Privacy, 41 CASE WESTERN RES. L. REV. 885, 898 (1991). 
95 17 U.S.C. § 201 (2012). 
96 See Danielle Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 345, 360 (2014). 
97 Amanda Levendowski, Using Copyright to Combat Revenge Porn, 3 N.Y.U. J. 
INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 422, 439 (2014). 
98 See Jonathan Griffiths, European Union Copyright Law and the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights—Advocate General Szpunar’s Opinions in (C-469/17) Funke Medien, 
(C-476/17) Pelham GmbH and (C-516/17) Spiegel Online, 20 ERA F. 35, 38 (2019). 
99 Case C-469/17, Funke Medien NRW GmbH v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 2018 
E.C.R. 870, available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&do-
cid=207024&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid 
=1948409 [https://perma.cc/K4E4-UVVA]. On the facts and the opinion of Advocate 
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July 29, 2019, the ECJ ruled that “freedom of information and free-
dom of the press, enshrined in Article 11 of the [EU] Charter, are 
not capable of justifying, beyond the exceptions or limitations  
provided for in [the European Copyright Directive], a derogation 
from the author’s exclusive rights of reproduction and of communi-
cation to the public.”100 Thus, just as in the United States, neither 
freedom of expression nor freedom of the press constitutes an  
autonomous ground to override the exclusive rights of a copyright 
holder, unless an exception or a limitation listed in the Copyright 
Directive is applicable.101 
On the other hand, reflecting the high value placed on freedom 
of speech in American and European cultures, courts in both juris-
dictions have restricted privacy torts in order to protect that free-
dom.102 Thus, even though privacy torts can be invoked to deal with 
the publication of false or unknown information, they do not offer 
an adequate mechanism to protect true personal information from 
unwanted dissemination.103 Furthermore, while copyright protects 
content created by the subject, it does not include non-creative uses 
of the work.104 
None of the torts or protective mechanisms discussed above  
address in a coherent way the issue of the unconsented publication 
of true personal information. There are three main reasons for this. 
First, most privacy violation cases are based solely on hypothetical 
future harm and, in the absence of sufficient evidence proving direct 
 
General see Stijn van Deursen & Thom Snijders, The Court of Justice at the Crossroads: 
Clarifying the Role for Fundamental Rights in the EU Copyright Framework, 49 INT’L 
REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMP. L. 1080 (2018) (highlighting the differences between the 
approaches taken by the ECJ and the ECtHR on that matter). 
100 See Case C-469/17, at ¶ 64. 
101 Council Directive 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 
2019 on Copyright and Related Rights in the Digital Single Market and amending 
Directives 96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC, 2019 O.J. (L 130). 
102 Quin Landon, The First Amendment and Speech-Based Torts: Recalibrating the 
Balance, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 157, 165 (2011). 
103 Paul A. Freund, Privacy: One Concept or Many, in PRIVACY & PERSONALITY 188, 188 
(Ronald Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1971). 
104 For more information and the recent developments, see R. Anthony Reese, 
Copyrightable Subject Matter in the “Next Great Copyright Act, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1489 (2015). 
2019] TOWARDS A TRANSATLANTIC CONCEPT OF DATA PRIVACY 161 
 
or actual harm, courts tend to dismiss data breach claims.105 Second, 
the disclosure or use of information on the Internet is often covered 
by the website’s terms of use. Even though those are seldom read 
and even less often understood, Section 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act immunizes websites for the content published on their 
sites: “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall 
be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided 
by another information content provider.”106 Third, privacy 
breaches do not end with the intrusion. Often subsequent republica-
tion on the Internet by third parties causes more harm than the orig-
inal breach.107 Nevertheless, since in most instances the First 
Amendment protects the right to discuss and report on matters of 
public interest, the latter protects most republishers.108 
Needless to say, the Constitutional Convention could not have 
foreseen the evolution in communication technology when it ratified 
the First Amendment in 1791.109 However, as Justice Sotomayor has 
highlighted, “[T]he premise that an individual has no reasonable  
expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third 
parties . . . is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a 
great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the 
course of carrying out mundane tasks.”110 The U.S. Supreme Court 
Justice’s concern became more pronounced with the growing use of 
social media tools, live-streaming video, and direct messaging.  
 
105 Khan v. Children’s Nat’l Health Sys., 188 F. Supp. 3d 524, 534 (D. Md. 2016). 
106 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2018). 
107 Mills and Harclerode illustrate the impact of republication with a stunning example: 
“In 2016, a group of Russian hackers used a spear phishing attack to breach the email 
account of John Podesta, the chairman of Hillary Clinton’s 2016 presidential campaign. 
This initial intrusion, the original publication of the emails on Wikileaks, and the 
subsequent republication of the emails on almost every news site imaginable played a 
substantial—but largely immeasurable—role in Donald Trump’s defeat of Hillary Clinton 
in November 2016.” Jon L. Mills & Kelsey Harclerode, Privacy, Mass Intrusion and the 
Modern Data Breach, 69 FLA. L. REV. 771, 776–77 (2018). 
108 But see The Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 700 (protecting a person who has filed for 
bankruptcy by prohibiting public and private actors to hurt that person’s future as a result 
of the divulgation of the information); The Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 
(2012) (protecting individuals from the willful and/or negligent inclusion of inaccurate 
information in their credit report and to prevent unwarranted invasion of privacy). 
109 On the evolution of First Amendment doctrine, see Thomas W. Joo, The Worst Test 
of Truth: The “Marketplace of Ideas” as Faulty Metaphor, 89 TULANE L. REV. 383 (2014). 
110 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
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Social media serves, at first sight, similar functions of informing  
and entertaining as traditional media.111 Indeed, just having access 
to a computer makes it possible to record and publish images,  
experiences, ideas, and emotions, and reach millions of people at the 
same speed as television, although not always with the depth of a 
newspaper or magazine.112 In the legal context, the creation of such 
a “sociological archive” raises difficult normative problems regard-
ing the interpretation of matters of public concern and the limits of 
self-determination. Can the loss of self-determination itself be 
deemed sufficient evidence of the harm suffered by the plaintiff 
in a breach of privacy case? To what extent does the First Amend-
ment apply to social media content or Internet search engines?113 
Can a right to know be sustained as a matter of constitutional prin-
ciple?114 Can all active Internet users and social media enthusiasts 
be considered as their own “press” in terms of the First Amendment? 
If the question is answered in the negative, what kind of content  
deserves the application of the special press privileges? If the ques-
tion is answered in the affirmative, does the protection offered by 
the First Amendment not swallow the right to privacy? 
 
111 An author defines social media as “the many relatively inexpensive and widely 
accessible electronic tools that enable anyone to publish and access information, 
collaborate on a common effort, or build relationships.” DHIRAJ MURTHY, TWITTER: SOCIAL 
COMMUNICATION IN THE TWITTER AGE 7 (2013). 
112 A leading trust study has revealed that search engines and social media platforms play 
a key role in explaining why the media is the least trusted institution. 2018 Edelman Trust 
Barometer Reveals Record-Breaking Drop in Trust, EDELMAN (Jan. 22, 2018), 
www.edelman.com/news-awards/2018-edelman-trust-barometer-reveals-record-breaking-
drop-trust-in-the-us [https://perma.cc/3MQ7-4VS4]. See also Craig Silverman, Lies, Damn 
Lies, and Viral Content, TOW CTR. DIGITAL JOURNALISM 146 (Sept. 5, 2017), 
https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/D8Q81RHH [https://perma.cc/
MG83-TU6A]. 
113 Oren Bracha notes that “the claim that First Amendment protection extends to ranking 
of search results may appear well founded, at least as a matter of positive law.” Oren 
Bracha, The Folklore of Informationalism: The Case of Search Engine Speech, 82 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1629, 1685 (2014). However, according to the author, “on closer 
examination, this certainty disappears, [since] the First Amendment has a vital role to play 
in limiting governmental power.” Id. at 1632. 
114 See Lillian R. BeVier, An Informed Public, an Informing Press: The Search for a 
Constitutional Principle, 68 CAL. L. REV. 517 (1980) (concluding that “the first 
amendment does not in principle guarantee that a well-informed citizenry with the press as 
its constitutionally appointed information gathering agent are values of affirmative, 
independent constitutional significance”). 
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In an evolving technological landscape, new ways of legal think-
ing are needed in order to respond properly to these pressing ques-
tions. In another common law jurisdiction, Justice Mann of the High 
Court of England and Wales issued an unusual and inspiring deci-
sion in the recent Mirror News Paper phone hacking case, Gulati.115 
This decision defines loss as the diminution of the plaintiff’s right 
to privacy itself and thus considerably broadens the scope of privacy 
tort: 
Those values (or interests) [i.e., the protection of  
the individual's informational autonomy] are not  
confined to protection from distress, and it is not in 
my view apparent why distress (or some similar emo-
tion), which would admittedly be a likely conse-
quence of an invasion of privacy, should be the only 
touchstone for damages. While the law is used to 
awarding damages for injured feelings, there is no 
reason in principle, in my view, why it should not 
also make an award to reflect infringements of the 
right itself, if the situation warrants it. The fact that 
the loss is not scientifically calculable is no more a 
bar to recovering damages for ‘loss of personal  
autonomy’ or damage to standing than it is to dam-
ages for distress. If one has lost the right to control 
the dissemination of information about one’s private 
life then I fail to see why that, of itself, should not 
attract a degree of compensation, in an appropriate 
case. A right has been infringed, and loss of a kind 
recognised by the court as wrongful has been caused. 
It would seem to me to be contrary to principle not to 
recognise that as a potential route to damages.116 
While this decision does not solve all the normative problems when 
it comes to the limits of self-determination, it does show that a more 
liberal approach to privacy is possible. Whether American law or 
 
115 Gulati v. MGN Ltd. [2015] EWHC 1482 (Ch), ¶ 111, available at www.5rb.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/05/MGN-trial-jt-REDACTED.pdf [https://perma.cc/UK5N-HT8J]. 
116 Id. 
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continental European law can provide the grounds upon which to 
base such an ingenious and original decision remains to be seen. 
B. Gaps in Existing Data Protection Norms 
The definitions of privacy and personal data, as well as the scope 
of their protections, have been subject to ongoing change as a result 
of rapid technological advances (e.g. genomic data) and globaliza-
tion.117 As exemplified by the recent complaint with the Federal 
Trade Commission (“FTC”) alleging that Amazon’s Alexa or simi-
lar devices violate the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act 
(“COPPA”) because they collect and process personal data by  
recording kids’ voice conversations,118 these ongoing changes make  
it difficult to predict the outcome of the cases where data protection 
laws could apply. However, the evolution of the right to data  
protection has acquired distinctive and essentially stable character-
istics that reliably distinguish it, to some extent, from the right to 
privacy. Data protection is about securing “personal data,” rather 
than providing redress for “injury to [a] plaintiff’s emotions and his 
[or her] mental suffering.”119 The Organization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development’s (“OECD”) Guidelines on the Protection 
of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data defines personal 
data as “any information relating to an identified or identifiable  
individual (data subject).”120 
In the EU, data protection is seen as a specific expression of the 
right to privacy,121 and therefore specific rules set forth in the GDPR 
 
117 Magi, supra note 74, at 206 (concluding that “the term ‘privacy’ is difficult to define 
and perhaps best used as an umbrella term to describe a web of related concepts”). 
118 Request for Investigation of Amazon, Inc.’s Echo Dot Kids Edition for Violating the 
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, FTC (May 9, 2019), https://drive.google.com/
file/d/1RptCGM-88t08xGj3CaxKMMbml7glT1EK/view [https://perma.cc/Q7AE-TEN2]. 
119 Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the 
Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV. 957, 958 (1989) (defining the purpose of privacy tort 
by referring to Froelich v. Adair, 516 P.2d 993, 997 (1973) and Hazlitt v. Fawcett 
Publications, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 538, 544 (D. Conn. 1953)). 
120 OECD GUIDELINES ON THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND TRANSBORDER FLOWS OF 
PERSONAL DATA, art. 1(b) (2013), www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesonthe
protectionofprivacyandtransborderflowsofpersonaldata.htm#part1 
[https://perma.cc/MD9G-4N2C]. 
121 Juliane Kokott & Christoph Sobotta, The Distinction Between Privacy and Data 
Protection in the Jurisprudence of the CJEU and the ECtHR, 3 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 
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regulate it.122 In contrast, data privacy regulation in the United States 
is currently a kind of “hodgepodge,”123 because it is not underpinned 
by a clear, unified right to privacy. Instead of a federal law regulat-
ing the way entities across all industries are allowed to collect and 
use consumer data, there is a horde of different laws applying to 
various issues and sectors of the economy. For example, COPPA 
regulates the protection of the privacy of children under the age of 
13 in their interactions with online websites. Another example is the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”), which applies to financial in-
stitutions and establishes requirements designed to protect consumer 
data. Furthermore, the Health Insurance Portability and Accounta-
bility Act (“HIPAA”) safeguards the privacy of individually identi-
fiable health information.124 
The Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”)125 was one of the first 
instances of data protection law passed in the digital age.126 The 
FCRA has been amended several times since it was enacted in 1970. 
The 2013 amendment empowers consumers to dispute the complete-
ness, accuracy, or fairness of information mentioned in a report and 
to request the correction or deletion of negative information found 
on a credit report if it is associated with the consumer’s personal 
information.127 Even if, at first sight, the scope of application of the 
 
222, 222 (2013) (discussing “the relevant jurisprudence of Europe’s two highest courts, the 
European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg . . . and the CJEU, with regard to the 
differences between privacy and data protection”). 
122 Bart van der Sloot, Legal Fundamentalism: Is Data Protection Really a Fundamental 
Right?, in DATA PROTECTION AND PRIVACY: (IN)VISIBILITIES AND INFRASTRUCTURE 3 
(Ronald Leenes et al. eds., 2017). 
123 Glancy, supra note 22, at 359. 
124 See United States v. Bormes, 568 U.S. 6 (2012); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. V. 
Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 622 (2012); Watters v. Wachovia Bank, 550 U.S. 1 (2007). 
125 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (2018). 
126 On various occasions the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld and enforced this Act. See 
Bormes, 568 U.S. at 613; Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011); Safeco Ins. Co. 
of Am. V. Burr, 551 U.S. 47 (2007). Recent constitutional challenges to the FCRA have 
been rejected. See King v. Gen. Info. Servs., Inc., 903 F. Supp. 2d 303 (E.D. Pa. 2012); see 
also, Memorandum of the United States of America in Support of the Constitutionality of 
§ 1681c of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, King v. Gen. Info. Servs., Inc., 903 F. Supp. 2d 
303 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (No. 2:10-cv-06850-PBT), available at www.ftc.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/amicus_briefs/shamara-t.king-v.general-information-services-inc./
120508fcraking-gis.pdf [https://perma.cc/5NJW-XP5T]. 
127 15 U.S.C. § 1681(i)(a)(5)(A) (2012). 
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FCRA seems narrower than that of the GDPR, the protection it of-
fers is actually very similar, as it grants American citizens a right 
similar to the right to erase conferred to EU citizens following 
Google Spain, provided that search engines can be classified as 
credit reporting agencies.128 
Nevertheless, many types of data collection, such as databases 
used to target sales and marketing efforts and airline reservation 
data, fall outside the scope of these federal statutes.129 In the United 
States, the FTC Act, which established the FTC and is the most 
wide-ranging federal data privacy regulation, partially fills the 
gap.130 Indeed, the FTC is the primary regulatory body for data pro-
tection, even though it was not created for this specific purpose.131 
On the basis of Section 45 of the Act, the FTC regulates “[u]fair 
methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or  
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”132 Within this 
framework, a misleading representation, practice, or omission will 
 
128 And they might well be, since, besides collecting information a user actively gives 
when typing a search query, search engines also gather information through the use of 
cookies or similar technologies. See generally Mark T. Andrus, Constitutional Issues in 
Granting Americans a “Right to Dispute” Personal Information with Search Engines Akin 
to the Existing Remedy Afforded to Europeans Via Europe’s Right to Be Forgotten, BUS. 
L. TODAY (Sept. 19, 2018), www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/
2016/11/07_andrus [https://perma.cc/BWB7-SZ6F]. 
129 Stephen Cobb, Data Privacy and Data Protection: U.S. Law and Legislation, ESET 
6 (2016), https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/US-data-privacy-
legislation-white-paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/DT9Q-TD75]. 
130 Woodrow Hartzog & Daniel J. Solove, The Scope and Potential of FTC Data 
Protection, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2230, 2233 (2015). 
131 Andrew Serwin, The Federal Trade Commission and Privacy: Defining Enforcement 
and Encouraging the Adoption of Best Practices, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 809, 814 (2011). 
132 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006). See generally Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, 
Pub. L. No. 63-203, 38 Stat. 717 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2006)) 
(FTC’s primary goal was to “prevent persons, partnerships, or Corporations . . . from using 
unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices in or affecting commerce.”). See generally Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, Pub. 
L. No. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27 (2006) and 29 
U.S.C. §§ 52–53 (2006)) (stating that one of the primary goals of the FTC was to prevent 
the acquisition of “the whole or any part of the assets of one or more persons engaged in 
commerce or in any activity affecting commerce,” when the intention of the person seeking 
to acquire such assets was to lessen competition or to create a monopoly). See Serwin, 
supra note 131, at 814–15 (“FTC was originally created in 1914 in order to protect 
competition among businesses.”). 
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be deemed “deceptive” and thus give rise to liability if it is “mate-
rial,” when viewed from the perspective of a reasonably acting  
consumer,133 and a consumer acting in reasonable reliance on the 
material representation, practice, or omission would foreseeably 
suffer injury, loss, or harm in consequence of that reliance.134 Thus, 
the FTC’s authority to regulate consumer data protection in all  
industries not specifically targeted by federal law is based upon data  
subjects’ deception. 
Under Section 45, the FTC is able to sue companies that use  
deceptive practices. It can do so either on its own or upon referrals, 
from either EU data protection authorities or third-party private dis-
pute resolution providers. Some critics argue that this system is slow 
and complicated and does not help consumers.135 Moreover,  
although the FTC has obtained numerous settlements, including in 
some of the largest data breach lawsuits, the phrase “unfair or  
deceptive” clearly limits its authority. Federal courts have recently 
cast doubt on the FTC’s right to deal with personal data breaches. In 
LabMD, for instance, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
ruled that “the [FTC’s] complaint alleges no specific unfair acts or 
practices engaged in by LabMD.”136 
Examples of personal data breaches are multiple, but the recent 
cases of Equifax, Facebook, and Ashley Madison are the most  
striking ones in the United States. Equifax, one of the nation’s  
largest credit reporting companies, has recently revealed a massive 
data breach that affected more than 148 million Americans.137 In its 
statements made in 2017 and 2018, the company reported that the 
names and dates of birth of approximately 146.6 million people 
 
133 See Letter from James C. Miller III, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Congressman 
John D. Dingell, Chairman, House Comm. on Energy Commerce 1 (Oct. 14, 1983), 
www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/410531/831014deceptionstmt.pd
f [https://perma.cc/SR2L-PCHF]. 
134 See id. 
135 See Serwin, supra note 131, at 816. 
136 LabMD, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 894 F.3d 1221, 1230 (11th Cir. 2018). See also 
Fed. Trade Comm’n v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 883 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 2018). 
137 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-559, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL 
REQUESTERS: DATA PROTECTION ACTIONS TAKEN BY EQUIFAX AND FEDERAL AGENCIES IN 
RESPONSE TO THE 2017 BREACH (2018), https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/694158.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5HPA-8R2J]. 
168           FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.      [Vol. XXX:139 
 
were exposed, as well as 145.5 million Social Security numbers, the  
address information for 99 million people, the gender data for 27.3 
million people, 20.3 million consumers’ phone numbers, 17.6  
million driver’s license numbers, 1.8 million email addresses, 
209,000 credit card numbers and expiration dates, and 97,500 tax  
ID numbers.138 
In another data privacy scandal in March 2018, Facebook  
declared that the personal data of 87 million users worldwide had 
been collected through an app from November 2013 to May 2015 
and transferred to Cambridge Analytica, a political consulting 
firm.139 Millions of users’ data was accessed and exploited, without 
the data subjects’ consent, to create politically useful profiling and 
micro-target citizens, giving campaign groups the ability to connect 
with individual voters.140 
Another example is the Ashley Madison data breach.141 In  
July 2015, an anonymous hacker group calling itself the Impact 
Team hacked into Ashley Madison, an online cheating website and 
threatened to publish the stolen information unless Ashley Madison 
was permanently shut down.142 The parent company, Avid Life  
Media, refused and, as a result, the hackers uploaded about thirty 
gigabytes of stolen data on the dark web. This data included the per-
sonal information of the site’s users—data the website had promised 
not to keep—as well as information about the company, such as  
financial data, and employee salary information. The users whose 
data was published have faced several problems during the litigation 
 
138 See Equifax Inc., Equifax’s Statement for the Record Regarding the Extent of the 
Cybersecurity Incident Announced on September 7, 2017, https://www.sec.gov/Archives/
edgar/data/33185/000119312518154706/d583804dex991.htm [https://perma.cc/BUM9-
X8XW]. 
139 Nicholas Confessore, Cambridge Analytica and Facebook: The Scandal and the 
Fallout So Far, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/us/
politics/cambridge-analytica-scandal-fallout.html [https://perma.cc/F8SJ-AF5T]. 
140 Id. 
141 See Zetter, supra note 14; Krebs, supra note 14; Baraniuk, supra note 14. 
142 Id. 
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process, including an order issued by the federal district judge ap-
pointed to lead the multidistrict litigation to publicly disclose the 
class representatives’ names.143 
The number of persons affected by the cases mentioned above 
and the procedural difficulties they encountered in remedying  
the damage caused by the alleged data breaches can serve as an  
illustration of the burdens that the current legal system imposes on 
an individual seeking to redress the misuse of personal information 
in a timely and satisfactory manner.144 On the one hand, as Chief 
Justice John Roberts pointed out in Riley, “the fact that technology 
now allows an individual to carry such information in his hand  
does not make the information any less worthy of the protection for 
which the Founders fought.”145 On the other hand, both the hacked 
businesses and the individual victims are under the impression that 
the judicial system should be adaptable to technological develop-
ments.146 As hackers are most often located outside the country’s 
jurisdiction, identifying who is liable is a difficult task.147 The  
victims’ frustration rises even further due to their inability to prevent 
bloggers, the media and others from copying, republishing, or  
commenting on the stolen data. This is, so to speak, part of most 
hackers’ plans: republication of the data after the hack to harm their 
 
143 Order Granting Final Approval of Settlement, Cy Pres Distribution, and Award of 
Attorney’s Fees and Service Awards to the Class Representative, In re Ashley Madison 
Customer Data Sec. Breach, Litig., No. 4:15-md-02669 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 20, 2017), 
available at https://www.moed.uscourts.gov/sites/moed/files/documents/415md2669-
0383.pdf [https://perma.cc/5RQ9-ML9L]. 
144 Thomas Nagel, The Shredding of Public Privacy, in CONCEALMENT AND EXPOSURE 
27 (2002) (discussing “the culmination of a disastrous erosion of the precious but fragile 
conventions of personal privacy in the United States over the past ten or twenty years”). 
145 Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014). 
146 See, e.g., Cameron F. Kerry, Why Protecting Privacy Is a Losing Game Today—And 
How to Change the Game, BROOKINGS (July 12, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/ 
research/why-protecting-privacy-is-a-losing-game-today-and-how-to-change-the-game/ 
[https://perma.cc/N7D3-FJST] (“We need an American answer—a more common law 
approach adaptable to changes in technology—to enable data-driven knowledge and 
innovation while laying out guardrails to protect privacy.”). 
147 Larry Greenemeier, Seeking Address: Why Cyber Attacks Are So Difficult to Trace 
Back to Hackers, SCI. AM. (June 11, 2011), www.scientificamerican.com/article/tracking-
cyber-hackers/?redirect=1 [https://perma.cc/62FN-X46N] (noting that “an attack may 
appear to come from a particular server or computer, but this does not mean the attack 
originated at that device”). 
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target. Freedom of expression and freedom of the press protect the 
republication of hacked data, leaving a data subject very little  
opportunity to seek relief once the media have gotten a hold of stolen 
data.148 However, the fact that technology now allows data to be dis-
persed across many operational systems and disseminated over wide 
geographical distances should not make data any less worthy of the 
protection.149 Indeed, as many as 88% of Americans would support 
the adoption of the so-called “right to erasure of personal data.”150 
II. LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THE CHALLENGES TO DATA 
PRIVACY 
Recent legislative efforts at the state and federal levels in the 
United States indicate that Americans are as concerned about data 
privacy as are Europeans, even though the latter have implemented 
more laws on that subject.151 
A. Recent Developments Following the CCPA 
The tendency to reinforce data privacy protection on the basis of 
new rules instead of relying on the existing ones have become more 
noticeable in the EU than in the United States, particularly with the 
adoption of the GDPR.152 However, privacy protection and data se-
curity, which include the right to erase, are not only on the EU 
agenda. It seems that the developments in data privacy protection in 
the EU have been used to ratchet up standards in the United States. 
In May 2014, reporting serious concerns about the privacy  
implications of “people search” services that permit access to large 
 
148 Mills & Harclerode, supra note 107, at 784. 
149 Former Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts similarly highlighted that “the fact 
that technology now allows an individual to carry such information in his hand does not 
make the information any less worthy of the protection.” See Riley, 573 U.S. at 403. 
150 Rebecca Heilweil, How Close Is An American Right-To-Be-Forgotten?, FORBES (Mar. 
4, 2018), www.forbes.com/sites/rebeccaheilweil1/2018/03/04/how-close-is-an-american-
right-to-be-forgotten/#37851d33626e [https://perma.cc/FWY9-JT68]. 
151 See “Take Back Your Data” Campaign, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/other/take-
back-your-dataprivacy-rights-pocket-card [https://perma.cc/6RL5-UWB7]. 
152 W. Gregory Voss, European Union Data Privacy Law Reform: General Data 
Protection Regulation, Privacy Shield, and the Right to Delisting, 72 BUS. LAWYER 221 
(2017). 
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amounts of an individual’s personal information based solely on  
a search of that individual’s name, the FTC recommended to the 
Congress a broader privacy protection.153 The FTC advocated for 
legislation that would require data brokers to154:  
(1) allow consumers to access their own information; 
(2) allow consumers to opt out of the use of the in-
formation;  
(3) clearly disclose to consumers the data brokers’ 
sources of information, so that, if possible, the con-
sumer can correct his or her information at the 
source; and  
(4) clearly disclose any limitations of the opt out, 
such as the fact that close matches of an individual’s 
name may continue to appear in search results.155 
The FTC’s recommendation highlights the fact that current 
American privacy law does not efficiently address the issue of data 
protection. The general public shares this point of view. A 2017  
Harris poll of more than one thousand Americans found that eight 
in ten adults are concerned about the ability of businesses to safe-
guard their financial and personal information.156 The 2017 Norton 
Cyber Security Insights Report revealed the cost of data security 
failures in financial terms: cybercrime cost American consumers 
 
153 FED. TRADE COMM’N, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY 54 (2014), www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/data-brokers-
call-transparency-accountability-report-federal-trade-commission-may-
2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/CYT4-8ZER]. 
154 According to the OECD, “data brokers are firms that gather and merge aggregated 
information on individuals that is then sold for various uses such as employment 
background checks, the issuing of credit and for law enforcement purposes.” See Exploring 
the Economics of Personal Data: A Survey of Methodologies for Measuring Monetary 
Value, OECD (Apr. 2, 2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k486qtxldmq-en [https://perma.
cc/56BB-F8Y7]. 
155 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 153, at ix. 
156 AICPA, supra note 73. This survey was conducted by The Harris Poll by telephone 
within the United States between October 12 and 15, 2017, among 1,006 adults. Figures 
for age, sex, race/ethnicity, education, region and household income were weighted (using 
data from the Current Population Survey) where necessary to bring them into line with 
their actual proportions in the population. 
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$19.4 billion of their own money in 2017.157 This high cost  
importantly shows that American businesses taken as a whole have 
failed to implement the principles known collectively as “Privacy 
by Design.”158 These principles reflect the idea that privacy 
measures and privacy enhancing technologies should be embedded 
directly into the design of information technologies and systems, 
providing a proactive rather than a reactive approach.159 
In order to respond to this concern, some state lawmakers in the 
United States enacted several measures taking European data pro-
tection concept as a model. That is why, before turning to the recent 
developments in the United States, it is necessary to mention briefly 
the process of the adoption of the GDPR, which makes Privacy  
by Design a mandatory provision for businesses.160 The effort to  
enact a new data protection law in the EU goes back to November 
2010 when, after years of reflection, consultation, and debates, the 
Vice-President of the European Commission and EU Justice Com-
missioner, Viviane Reding, announced a reform designed to make 
Europe the standard setter for modern data protection rules in the 
 
157 2017 Norton Cyber Security Insights Report, SYMANTEC (2018), 
www.symantec.com/content/dam/symantec/docs/about/2017-ncsir-global-comparison-
united-states-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/5AFZ-B8QZ]. 
158 For other reasons companies increasingly felt unwilling to follow self-regulatory 
privacy standards, see Justin Brookman, Protecting Privacy in an Era of Weakening 
Regulation, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 355, 362–64 (2015). 
159 For more information on Privacy-by-Design, see Ann Cavoukian & Jeff Jonas, 
Privacy by Design in the Age of Big Data, PRIVACY BY DESIGN (June 8, 2012), 
https://jeffjonas.typepad.com/Privacy-by-Design-in-the-Era-of-Big-Data.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/E9AW-VM6C]; JEROEN VAN REST ET AL., DESIGNING PRIVACY-BY-
DESIGN, ANNUAL PRIVACY FORUM 2012: PRIVACY TECHNOLOGIES AND POLICY 55 (2012). 
160 See GDPR, supra note 17, art. 25 (“Taking into account the state of the art, the cost 
of implementation and the nature, scope, context and purposes of processing . . . , the 
controller shall, both at the time of the determination of the means for processing and at 
the time of the processing itself, implement appropriate technical and organizational 
measures . . . to protect the rights of data subjects. The controller shall implement 
appropriate technical and organizational measures for ensuring that, by default, only 
personal data which are necessary for each specific purpose of the processing are 
processed. That obligation applies to the amount of personal data collected, the extent of 
their processing, the period of their storage and their accessibility. In particular, such 
measures shall ensure that by default personal data are not made accessible without the 
individual’s intervention to an indefinite number of natural persons.”). 
2019] TOWARDS A TRANSATLANTIC CONCEPT OF DATA PRIVACY 173 
 
digital age.161 In January 2012, the European Commission revealed 
its proposal to adopt more concrete remedies, as well as its proposal 
to create a far-reaching new privacy right—the “right to erase.”162  
If certain conditions regarding the data are met,163 a data subject may 
exercise the right to erase and thereby place an obligation on the data 
controller to check the conditions for erasure of the specified per-
sonal data “without undue delay.”164 In 2014, the ECJ held for the 
first time that EU citizens have a right to erase.165 Over the last few 
years, Reding’s speech and this decision constraining Google’s pub-
lic disclosure of private facts have widely been debated.166 The right 
to erase was then codified in Article 17(2) of the GDPR, which  
creates a stronger and more cohesive data protection law than the 
1995 Data Protection Directive.167 The GDPR entered into force on 
 
161 Viviane Reding, Vice-President of the European Comm’n, Privacy Matters—Why 
The EU Needs New Personal Data Protection Rules, Speech at the European Data 
Protection and Privacy Conference (Nov. 20, 2010), europa.eu/rapid/press-release
_SPEECH-10-700_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/SXW4-AEMS]. It is worth noting that at that 
time, several European countries developed laws protecting privacy rights and 
implemented the concept of a right to be forgotten into their national privacy policy.  
See, e.g., BVerfGE 65, 1 BvR 209/83, Dec. 15, 1983, https://www.bundesverfassungs
gericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/DE/1983/12/rs19831215_1bvr020983.html 
[https://perma.cc/5CQT-N9YC] (judgment of the German Constitutional Court ruling that 
individuals are entitled to determine which information about themselves is known to 
others). For more information on this topic, see Gloria González Fuster, The Surfacing of 
National Norms on Data Processing in Europe, 74 Cambridge L.J. 245–47 (2014). 
162 Commission Proposal for a Regulation on the Protection of Individuals with Regard 
to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data (General Data 
Protection Regulation), COM (2012) 11 final (Jan. 25, 2012). 
163 GDPR, supra note 17, art. 17.1. 
164 Id. The timescale of appropriate delay is “about a month.” See Everything You Need 
to Know About the “Right to Be Forgotten,” GDPR.EU, https://gdpr.eu/right-to-be-
forgotten/ [https://perma.cc/LSF5-WNAN]. 
165 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos, 2014 
E.C.R. 717. 
166 For comments on Reding’s speech, see ORLA LYNSKEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EU 
DATA PROTECTION LAW 4, 232 (2015); Alexandra Rengel, PRIVACY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 
146 (2013); Rosen, supra note 36. On Google Spain, see generally Edward Lee, 
Recognizing Rights in Real Time: The Role of Google in the EU Right to Be Forgotten, 49 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1017 (2016); Post, supra note 35; Julia Powles, The Case That Won’t 
Be Forgotten, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 583 (2015). 
167 See generally Francoise Gilbert, The Right to Erasure or Right to Be Forgotten: What 
the Recent Law, Cases, and Guidelines Mean for Global Companies, 18 J. INTERNET L. 13 
(2015). 
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May 25, 2018 and replaced the Directive,168 which had not fully  
harmonized national privacy laws within Europe.169 
The legislative efforts in the EU are not limited to the adoption 
of the GDPR. To replace the 2002 e-Privacy Directive, on January 
10, 2017, the European Commission issued a proposal for a Regu-
lation on Privacy and Electronic Communications designed to  
update current rules to reflect technological developments, and to 
adapt the rules to fit within the GDPR’s regulatory framework.170 
This proposal aims at strengthening the rules on the protection of 
electronic communications data, for example by requiring that 
browser settings should disable cookies by default.171 Such a con-
figuration would allow Internet users to prevent other parties from 
 
168 See generally GDPR, supra note 17. 
169 Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Bart van der Sloot & Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius, The 
European Union General Data Protection Regulation: What It Is and What It Means, 28 
INFO. & COMM. TECH. L. 65, 71 (2019). 
170 Commission Proposal for a Regulation Concerning the Respect for Private Life and 
the Protection of Personal Data in Electronic Communications and Repealing Directive 
2002/58/EC (Regulation on Privacy and Electronic Communications), COM (2017) 10 
final (Jan. 10, 2017). 
171 See id. recital 24 (“For web browsers to be able to obtain end-users’ consent as defined 
under Regulation (EU) 2016/679, for example, to the storage of third party tracking 
cookies, they should, among others [sic], require a clear affirmative action from the end-
user of terminal equipment to signify his or her freely given, specific informed, and 
unambiguous agreement to the storage and access of such cookies in and from the terminal 
equipment. Such action may be considered to be affirmative, for example, if end-users are 
required to actively select ‘accept third party cookies’ to confirm their agreement and are 
given the necessary information to make the choice. To this end, it is necessary to require 
providers of software enabling access to internet that, at the moment of installation, end-
users are informed about the possibility to choose the privacy settings among the various 
options and ask them to make a choice. Information provided should not dissuade end-
users from selecting higher privacy settings and should include relevant information about 
the risks associated to allowing third party cookies to be stored in the computer, including 
the compilation of long-term records of individuals’ browsing histories and the use of such 
records to send targeted advertising. Web browsers are encouraged to provide easy ways 
for end-users to change the privacy settings at any time during use and to allow the user to 
make exceptions for or to whitelist certain websites or to specify for which websites (third) 
party cookies are always or never allowed.”). In this vein see also id. art. 10 (“Information 
and Options for Privacy Settings to Be Provided: 1. Software placed on the market 
permitting electronic communications, including the retrieval and presentation of 
information on the internet, shall offer the option to prevent third parties from storing 
information on the terminal equipment of an end-user or processing information already 
stored on that equipment. 2. Upon installation, the software shall inform the end-user about 
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storing or processing their information without consent. This 
browser default setting would harmonize well with the Privacy  
by Design approach implemented in the GDPR, which makes 
preservation of privacy a central part of the architecture of Internet 
products and services. Moreover, the Amendments also extend from 
six months to twelve months the periodic intervals at which users 
are given the opportunity to withdraw or confirm their consent  
regarding the use of their information. Finally, both the European 
Parliament and the Council agreed on the necessity to implement by 
default “Do-Not-Track” mechanisms in browser settings. Such 
mechanisms enable users to signal content providers their prefer-
ence towards behavioral advertising.172 In line with the GDPR, the 
Proposal expressly stated that a valid “opt-in” consent must be  
obtained from the user in order to send unsolicited electronic com-
munications such as e-mails, push notifications, or SMS.173 
These recent developments in data privacy outside American 
borders have already influenced, to some extent, the data protection 
policies of online companies such as eBay or Amazon, social media 
platforms like Twitter, and search engines such as Google.174 The 
 
the privacy settings options and, to continue with the installation, require the end-user to 
consent to a setting.”). 
172 Martin Degeling et al., We Value Your Privacy . . . Now Take Some Cookies: 
Measuring the GDPR’s Impact on Web Privacy, NETWORK & DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS 
SECURITY (NDSS) SYMP. 2019 1, 3 (2019), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1808.05096.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3ALY-YKSY]. 
173 As mentioned on the official website of the EU, in case of electronic marketing to 
existing customers regarding the company’s own similar products or services, such a 
consent is not required, on condition that, for each marketing communication, customers 
have the opportunity to withdraw their consent. This withdrawal right must be available 
free of charge. See generally Data Protection and Online Privacy, YOUR EUROPE: 
EUROPEAN UNION (June 14, 2019), https://europa.eu/youreurope/citizens/consumers/
internet-telecoms/data-protection-online-privacy/index_en.htm [https://perma.cc/452L-
QJP7]. 
174 See Ebay’s Commitment to GDPR, EBAY, https://www.ebayinc.com/company/
privacy-center/gdpr/ [https://perma.cc/6P4X-PAAK]; General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR), AMAZON WEB SERVICES, https://aws.amazon.com/compliance/gdpr-center/ 
[https://perma.cc/Y6UM-87Y7]; What is Twitter’s Approach to the GDPR?, TWITTER, 
https://gdpr.twitter.com/en/faq.html [https://perma.cc/EF7Y-T3PN]; Our Commitment to 
GDPR, GOOGLE, https://privacy.google.com/businesses/compliance/#!?modal_active=
none [https://perma.cc/EP2S-T2S3]. See also Ashley Stenning, Gone but Not Forgotten: 
Recognizing the Right to Be Forgotten in the U.S. to Lessen the Impacts of Data Breaches, 
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changes in data protection policies have also had a significant  
impact on other business areas in the United States, as well as in 
many other countries. EU law has indeed become a de facto standard 
for American technology companies in respect of data flows into  
the United States.175 For example, cloud-based-services offered by 
American providers to individuals in the EU have been modified to 
be in line with GDPR privacy policy requirements.176 The evolution 
of data protection in Europe has also influenced the path of Ameri-
can public policy. Nevertheless, consequent changes would not be a 
mere reaction to an apparent economic threat from the old continent, 
but rather the result of a number of converging technological, social, 
and legal changes in the field of privacy and data protection in  
the United States.177 The alarmist consequences about the loss of  
privacy reported by the new Harris poll mentioned above illustrate 
this phenomenon.178 
As a response to these consequences, and considering the GDPR 
as a model, on June 28, 2018, the state of California adopted the 
CCPA, which goes into effect on January 1, 2020. In addition to the 
CCPA, the Privacy Rights for California Minors in the Digital 
World Act, effective as of January 1, 2015, prohibits the collection 
of personal data of minors that would be shared with third parties 
for the purpose of advertising or marketing.179 The most significant 
feature of the California legislation is the provision granting to  
minors a right to be forgotten.180 A California resident who is under 
18 years of age is allowed to request the permanent deletion of any 
online content that is collected and stored about them by an online 
service company.181 
 
18 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 129, 157 (2016) (confirming that “American-based websites are 
already conforming their policies and actions to the privacy laws of the EU”). 
175 Maja Brkan, The Unstoppable Expansion of the EU Fundamental Rights to Data 
Protection, 23 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 815, 841 (2016). 
176 See W. Gregory Voss, European Union Data Privacy Law Reform: General Data 
Protection Regulation, Privacy Shield, and the Right to Delisting, 72 BUS. L. 221, 223 
(2017). 
177 See Priscilla M. Regan, The Globalization of Privacy: Implications of Recent Changes 
in Europe, 52 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 257, 270 (1993). 
178 See AICPA, supra note 73. 
179 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22580–22582 (West 2015). 
180 Id. § 22581(a)(1). 
181 Id. 
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The CCPA is the most rigorous general privacy and data security 
law in the United States. Even if, at first sight, the fact that this  
California law applies only to consumers makes the CCPA’s scope 
of application appear narrower than the GDPR’s scope,182 the effec-
tive territorial reach of the CCPA will not be limited to California. 
Since the headquarters of hundreds of high technology companies 
are in the region commonly known as “Silicon Valley,” the CCPA 
will reach their operations in most, if not all, of the states.183 
The CCPA incorporates in California law a large number of per-
sonal data rights found in the GDPR. It gives Californian consumers 
an effective means of control over their personal information. The 
CCPA defines “personal information” as any information that  
“identifies, relates to, describes, is capable of being associated  
with, or could reasonably be linked, directly or indirectly, with a 
particular consumer or household.”184 According to the Act, partic-
ularly (1) common identifiers that, when used, may allow the iden-
tification of the individual to whom the information in question may 
 
182 See California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1978.140(g). A 
resident is defined as “every individual who is in the State for other than a temporary or 
transitory purpose, and every individual who is domiciled in the State who is outside the 
State for a temporary or transitory purpose.” CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 17014 (West 
2019). Any “business” gathering the “personal information” of a consumer as defined 
above should comply with the CCPA. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1978.140. The definitions of 
“business” and “personal information” require explanation as well. The term of “business” 
is described fairly broadly, and it applies to any industry, whatever the method used to 
collect data, which is not the case at the federal level. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1978.140(c). To 
be more exact, the CCPA applies to any company that collects the personal information of 
Californians, is for profit, does business in California, and exceeds $25 million in gross 
revenue; handles the personal information of 50,000 or more consumers, devices or 
households; or derive more than 50% of their annual revenue from selling consumers 
personal information. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.140(c)(1)(A)-(C). Hence, even though it 
will only be a state law, its broad jurisdictional reach means that it will actually apply to 
companies throughout the United States and around the world. 
183 Fortune 1000 cited, particularly, Adobe Systems, Advanced Micro Devices (AMD), 
Agilent Technologies, Alphabet Inc. (formerly Google Inc.), Apple Inc., Applied 
Materials, Cisco Systems, eBay, Electronic Arts, Facebook, Hewlett Packard Enterprise, 
HP Inc., Intel, Intuit, Juniper Networks, KLA Tencor, Lam Research, LSI Logic, Maxim 
Integrated Products, NetApp, Netflix, Nvidia, Oracle Corporation, Salesforce.com, 
Sanmina-SCI, Symantec, Tesla, Inc., Visa Inc., Western Digital Corporation, Xilinx. 
Fortune 1000 (2019), SOMEKA, https://www.someka.net/excel-template/fortune-1000-
excel-list/ [https://perma.cc/77RC-27DW]. 
184 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(o)(1). 
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relate;185 (2) electronic network activity information, including, 
browser histories, search history, and any information regarding a 
consumer’s interaction with a Web site, application or advertise-
ment;186 (3) audio, electronic, visual, thermal, and olfactory infor-
mation;187 and (4) geolocation data are considered personal  
information.188 Moreover, the CCPA provides that any “inferences” 
drawn from various data elements of personal information “to create 
a profile about a consumer reflecting the consumer’s preference, 
characteristics, psychological trends, preferences, predispositions, 
behavior, attitudes, intelligence, abilities and aptitudes” constitutes 
personal information.189 
The adoption of the CCPA constitutes a non-negligible shift in 
the nation’s data privacy regime. First, the Act entitles consumers to 
know the categories and specific pieces of personal information that 
a business has collected within the past year, sold to a third party, or 
disclosed to another person for a business process.190 Second, the 
CCPA requires companies to provide consumers choice to opt out 
of the sale of their personal information, and companies are not al-
lowed to discriminate, with respect to prices or services, against con-
sumers who opt out.191 The personal information of individuals un-
der sixteen years cannot be sold, unless the latter exercise their 
“right to opt in”—i.e. they allow such sharing.192 Third, the Act 
states that businesses have to be open about their privacy policies, 
disclosing for example a list of the types of personal information 
gathered, sold, or disclosed to third parties over the last twelve 
months.193 Fourth, the Act provides a private right of action seeking 
damages or relief for consumers whose personal data “is subject to 
an unauthorized access and exfiltration, theft, or disclosure as a re-
sult of the business’ violation of the duty to implement and maintain 
 
185 Id. § (1)(A). 
186 Id. § (1)(F). 
187 Id. § (1)(H). 
188 Id. § (1)(G). 
189 See id. § (1)(K). 
190 Id. § 1798.100(a). 
191 Id. § 120(a). 
192 See id. § 120(d). 
193 See id. § 130(a)(5)(C)(i). 
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reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to the na-
ture of the information.”194 The statute also provides that violations 
can result in Attorney General investigation and enforcement under 
the Business and Professions Code if, after a thirty-day period, the 
business has not managed to cure the alleged violation.195 Fifth, the 
Act entitles consumers to a “right to delete,” allowing them to re-
quest that a business delete any information collected about the con-
sumer.196 A business that receives such a request must delete the 
information gathered and direct any “service providers” to do the 
same.197 The CCPA nevertheless provides that the “right to delete” 
cannot be exercised in a small number of circumstances, such as 
when the information is needed to complete a particular transaction 
for the consumer, to detect security incidents, or to ensure the right 
of another consumer to exercise his or her free speech.198 
A similar balance between diverse interests can be found in the 
GDPR as well. Recital 65 of the GDPR details the circumstances in 
which an organization’s right to process someone’s data might over-
ride an individual’s right to erase. An asserted interest in processing 
data takes priority over the right of erasure if the data: 
1) is used to exercise the right of freedom of  
expression; 
2) is used to comply with a legal ruling or obligation; 
3) is used to perform a task carried out in the public 
interest or when exercising an organization’s official 
authority; 
4) is necessary for public health purposes and its  
divulgation serves the public interest; 
5) is necessary to perform preventative or occupa-
tional medicine (provided the data is processed by  
a health professional who is subject to a legal obliga-
tion of professional secrecy); 
6) represents important information that serves  
the public interest, scientific research, historical  
 
194 See id. § 150(b)(1). 
195 See id. § 155(a). 
196 See id. § 105(a). 
197 See id. § 1798.105(c). 
198 See id. § 1798.105(d). 
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research, or statistical purposes and where erasure of 
the data would be likely to hinder the achievement 
that was the goal of the processing; and 
7) is used to establish of a legal defense or other legal 
claims.199 
This comparison of the CCPA and the GDPR reveals that,  
even if the rules aimed at protecting personal data are relatively  
recent, the legislative and regulatory developments in the United 
States and the EU point toward a harmonization process of data  
protection standards through the propagation of data protection  
laws and their substantive convergence. In this sense, rules on both 
sides of the Atlantic have been mutually shaping each other. The 
efforts in the United States at the state level to bring about a com-
prehensive data protection reform in conformity with the GDPR  
recognizes the GDPR’s potential to be a legislative guide for a 
greater globalization.200 
Since the start of 2019, the “California Effect,” whereby legisla-
tures take the CCPA as a model for their own data protection and 
privacy bills, has been felt in many states, including Hawaii,  
Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Mexico, New York, 
Washington, and North Dakota.201 Hence, at least at the state level, 
several American lawmakers set a new balance on the basis of the 
GDPR enabling diverse interests to coexist in an environment that 
fosters public awareness of—and respect for—privacy/data protec-
tion. The new laws set forth expansive catch-all rules and standards 
that provide general data security guidelines to address previously 
neglected regulatory areas or issues.202 That is why, for the time  
being, it seems that there is no “race to the bottom” in global stand-
ards. Far from seeking to lower data protection requirements, state 
legislatures are consolidating the effective alignment of standards 
with the GDPR. That is not the end of the problems, but it is the 
beginning of solutions. 
 
199 See GDPR, supra note 17, recital 65. 
200 For a similar view, see generally Michael D. Birnhack, The EU Data Protection 
Directive: An Engine of a Global Regime, 24 COMP. L. & SEC. REP. 508 (2008). 
201 See generally Marmor et al., supra note 42. 
202 DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 848–49 (5th 
ed. 2014). 
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B. Need for Large-Scale Projects 
Although state-level laws and regulations in the United States, 
such as the newly adopted CCPA, have benefits, they also give rise 
to significant challenges. Even if most state unfair or deceptive acts 
and practices statutes empower state Attorneys General to issue 
rules and regulations interpreting the law and establishing prohibited 
conduct,203 effective enforcement of the new rules at the state level 
does demand more cooperation and coordination between the FTC 
and state Attorneys General. 
State laws will likely remain ineffective for two reasons.204 The 
first reason behind the inefficiency of state-level regulations is that 
they are subject to federal law preemption.205 Indeed, constitutional 
challenges can—and do—occasionally invalidate state privacy 
laws.206 The second fact explaining the ineffectiveness of state-level 
regulations is that they often conflict with one another. Even if states 
have started to apply data protection rights as a component of  
the right to self-determination in general and of consumer law in 
particular, this process is too erratic to establish a national regime  
in line with rising international standards.207 Differences in state 
laws are likely affect consumers negatively, because the same type 
of information might well be protected in one state while remaining 
unprotected in another.208 Some states set higher data protection 
standards than others, and discrepancies also exist between state and 
federal levels, with the result that businesses can face considerable 
 
203 Cary Silverman & Jonathan L. Wilson, State Attorney General Enforcement of Unfair 
or Deceptive Acts and Practices Laws: Emerging Concerns and Solutions, 65 KAN. L. Rev. 
209, 212 (2016). 
204 Jolly, supra note 85, at 2. 
205 Schwartz, supra note 34, at 1976–77. 
206 Id. at 1977 (“It struck down a Vermont law that prohibited the sale, disclosure, and 
use of pharmacy records by ‘detailers,’ who used the information to help target doctors for 
the sale of prescription pharmaceuticals.”) (referencing Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. 
Ct. 2653, 2659–60 (2011)). 
207 See Nuala O’Connor, Reforming the U.S. Approach to Data Protection and Privacy, 
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Jan. 30, 2018), www.cfr.org/report/reforming-us-approach-
data-protection [https://perma.cc/3ZQZ-RTGA]. 
208 See Daniel Solove, The Growing Problems with the Sectoral Approach to Privacy 
Law, TEACH PRIVACY (Nov. 13, 2015), https://teachprivacy.com/problems-sectoral-
approach-privacy-law/ [https://perma.cc/MQ2K-2W78]. 
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difficulty in determining the correct standard of compliance.209 
Moreover, the choice of protecting privacy at the state level is not 
the best solution for businesses, because of the enormous transaction 
costs involved in complying with different sets of rules across sev-
eral jurisdictions, especially when each has its own unique matrix  
of privacy protections.210 Presently, cost-benefit analysis might lead 
American businesses to restrict their commercial activities to their 
local areas.211 
These issues, which are critical to consumers and businesses 
alike, make the adoption of a comprehensive federal privacy legis-
lation not only more desirable, but also more realistic in the context 
of the twenty-first century’s data protection challenges. If the federal 
government were to enact a data protection law along the lines of 
the EU’s regime, companies could accomplish international  
transfers and rapidly expand into international markets.212 
While various members of Congress have proposed bills to  
create a federal data privacy statute or data protection board,213  
nothing has passed through both the Senate and the House.214  
On February 26, 2019, the Consumer Protection and Commerce 
Subcommittee of the House Energy and Commerce Committee held 
a hearing titled “Protecting Consumer Privacy in the Era of Big 
Data.” Subcommittee chair Jan Schakowsky (D-IL) referred to the 
inefficacy of the system in her opening statement: “Reports of the 
abuse of personal information undoubtedly give Americans the 
creeps. . . . Without a comprehensive federal privacy law, the bur-
den has fallen completely on consumers to protect themselves. This 
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212 Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 837, 842–44 (1960) 
(arguing that, without transaction costs, commercial actors will always favor the course of 
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2014); Data Security Act of 2014, S. 1927, 113th Cong. (2d Sess. 2014); Data Security Act 
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must end.”215 One day later, the Senate Committee on Commerce, 
Science, and Transportation held a hearing on “Policy Principles for 
a Federal Data Privacy Framework in the United States.” During his 
opening address, Senator Roger Wicker (R-MS) said the following: 
“It is clear to me that we need a strong, national privacy law that 
provides baseline data protections, applies equally to business enti-
ties—both online and offline—and is enforced by the nation’s top 
privacy enforcement authority, the Federal Trade Commission.”216 
The FTC already works to protect privacy and improve  
data security in the online market,217 particularly when it comes  
to behavioral advertising. For example, the FTC has issued the  
following guidance: 
The most practical method of providing uniform 
choice for online behavioral advertising would likely 
involve placing a setting similar to a persistent 
cookie on a consumer’s browser and conveying that 
setting to sites that the browser visits, to signal 
whether or not the consumer wants to be tracked or 
receive targeted advertisements. To be effective, 
there must be an enforceable requirement that sites 
honor those choices.218 
However, the compliance with its recommended standards, particu-
larly with those aiming at regulating behavioral advertising through 
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a “Do Not Track Mechanism,”219 is voluntary.220 This is the reason 
why the FTC’s requirements fall far short of creating a compelling 
incentive for online companies to honor a consumer’s Do Not Track 
request. In order to remedy this issue, on May 21, 2019, Senator 
Hawley introduced the Do Not Track Act, which aims to give con-
sumers the power to block online companies from collecting any 
data beyond what is necessary for the companies’ online services.221 
The FTC’s authority and investigative tools would become more 
effective if political opinion coalesced into a nascent consensus that 
consumers must be given more control over the collection and use 
of their information, and if that consensus actually led to the passage 
of a federal data privacy act. According to Hyman and Kovacic, 
“Congress would eliminate the FTC’s jurisdictional limitations and 
give it the authority to enforce privacy across the board—including 
against not-for-profit institutions.”222 Humerick argues that “[E]ven 
if Congress does not ease the burden, the FTC must promulgate  
a rule that establishes a standard for general data protection and  
requires industry agencies to monitor data protection compliance 
throughout the States.”223 If the political will does develop to invig-
orate the FTC’s role in data protection, further study into whether 
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the FTC could use antitrust law as an appropriate tool to encourage 
businesses to offer better privacy protections would become  
particularly valuable.224 The potential importance of antitrust action 
in this area arises from the non-rivalrous nature of data: 
[D]ata is ‘non rivalrous’ in the sense that access to 
data by an operator does not, in and of itself, preclude 
access by other operators. Multi-homing by custom-
ers as well as the diversification of services offered 
by a single firm provides opportunities for the con-
current collection of user-specific data. However,  
accessing this data in the first place may be condi-
tioned on the capacity for the firm to build a  
sufficiently large customer base, which in turn de-
pends on the extent to which network and experience 
effects as well as scale economies act as [a potential] 
barrier to entry[, or] an element of such barrier and 
thus as a factor which limits competition.225  
This point of view is shared by numerous American lawyers, too.226 
A former Commissioner at the FTC, for instance, highlighted the 
fact that the entrenched sector-specific businesses’ “data-driven” 
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conducts may operate as a barrier to entry, and as such justify  
enforcement actions.227 
In the United States, most experts and academics too support the 
idea of an explicit individual right to regulate consumer data  
privacy.228 In addition, a bipartisan agreement appears to have  
developed concerning the need to fill the gap in data protection at 
federal level. The Former First Chief Privacy Officer for the U.S.  
Department of Homeland Security, Nuala O’Connor, has offered 
this explanation of the need to codify a federal law:  
Most Western countries have already adopted com-
prehensive legal protections for personal data, but the 
United States—home to some of the most advanced, 
and largest, technology and data companies in the 
world—continues to lumber forward with a patch-
work of sector-specific laws and regulations that fail 
to adequately protect data. U.S. citizens and compa-
nies suffer from this uneven approach—citizens  
because their data is not adequately protected, and 
companies because they are saddled with contradic-
tory and sometimes competing requirements.229 
There is nevertheless no general consensus as to what specifi-
cally the solution would be.230 The devil will be in the details. If 
Congress actually decides to pursue legislative action, it will have 
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to deal with serious issues, such as: What protection for what cate-
gories of data? For what data uses will customer have opt-out rights? 
What about opt-in rights? Should there be a private right of action? 
Despite all these uncertainties, the adoption of a federal privacy law 
creating a nationwide standard clearly would not only bring the  
European and American systems closer to each other, at least at the 
systematic level, but would also increase convergence between  
different regulatory systems within the United States. 
Two main reasons lie behind the desire in the United States to 
craft a unified law that would broaden the scope of data protec-
tion.231 Firstly, the current rules governing privacy—both at federal 
and state level in several states—do not offer protection sufficient 
to the task of responding effectively to concerns associated with  
today’s and tomorrow’s data breaches, and do not meet the expecta-
tions of consumers that are insufficiently informed of how their data 
is used.232 Secondly, even though some courts create new exceptions 
to existing rules or broaden the existing exceptions, the case law  
is still far from settled regarding how to remedy the data protection 
shortfall, and does not provide a satisfactory level of legal cer-
tainty.233 The climate of legal uncertainty caused by varying national 
approaches contributes to increasing the costs of legal services on 
which businesses rely in order to comply with different rules.234 As 
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a recent survey shows, the modernization of existing national legis-
lation would provide legal certainty not only for consumers but also, 
and particularly, for business.235 
Legal scholars and policy analysts have already raised ideas, 
made proposals, and described implementation scenarios in respect 
of future data protection law at the national level.236 Although many 
think that an EU-style law would not be compatible with the culture 
and structure of American law,237 conformity with the fundamental 
principles and rights of the GDPR would eliminate, to some extent, 
barriers to the transfer of personal information from one continent 
to another, as well as barriers to the operation of the global economic 
system.238 Indeed, data’s free-flowing nature requires an all- 
embracing legislation.239 However, this view does not imply that the 
role of national courts in developing a case-by-case test to deal with 
privacy and data protection claims should be disregarded. Legisla-
tive frameworks set standards which leave room for courts to decide 
under what circumstances a data breach occurs. 
III. COURTS’ EFFORTS TO DEVELOP AN EFFECTIVE AND BALANCED 
PROTECTION 
In addition to the intention on both sides of the Atlantic to adopt 
a more liberal approach to data privacy by way of legislative reform, 
the court decision in the United States and the EU have emphasized 
to protect private information as an aspect of the principle of self-
determination. The tests applied by the ECJ to public disclosure of 
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private facts are not significantly different than those applied by 
American courts. On the contrary, the case analysis shows that their 
practical concerns and approaches are rather similar. 
A. Practical Concerns and Approaches in the EU: Beyond Google 
Spain 
My study of EU law leads to two main findings. First, the ECJ’s 
approach is based on a case-by-case examination of different funda-
mental rights and other interests. Second, this approach permits the 
right to privacy to coexist with the right to access information and 
with freedom of expression, as evidenced by a statistical inference 
based on data derived directly from Google. 
1. Case-by-Case Appraisal 
One might wonder whether the parallel I have drawn between 
the American and European legislative efforts to establish new 
standards regarding the scope of the right to privacy and data  
security240 is supported by court-made law developed in the long-
standing struggle to find a fair solution to various data protection 
issues. I will demonstrate that, although the ECJ has broadened the 
scope of data protection in the EU, it did not ultimately lead to an 
imbalance that would unduly favor data protection over other rights. 
To get a full picture of the application of data protection law in the 
EU, Google Spain241 should be read in tandem with the recent Manni 
decision.242 Comparing this study with the case law established by 
American courts would illuminate the similarities and differences of 
both approaches. I will first sketch briefly Google Spain, which held 
that EU law gives persons a right to erase personal information from 
the Internet.243 I will then study Manni, where the ECJ highlighted 
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that the right to erase established in Google Spain is not  
unconditional and needs to be balanced against conflicting interests. 
The contrast between these two decisions gives a full picture of  
the Court’s implementation of the balancing test and reveals the  
conditions in which the right to erase is to be exercised. 
The Google Spain case started with a Spanish citizen, Mario 
Costeja González, filing a complaint with the Spanish Data  
Protection Agency against a local newspaper, La Vanguardia, and 
Google Spain.244 In 1998, the newspaper had published announce-
ments about real estate auctions held to secure repayment of Mr. 
González’s social security debts.245 The newspaper’s auction notices 
had also been made available on the web.246 In November 2009, Mr. 
González asked the local newspaper to delete the pages or alter them 
so that his personal data would no longer be displayed.247 Over ten 
years after their publication, Mr. González argued that these pages 
were no longer necessary because “the attachment proceedings  
concerning him had been fully resolved for a number of years and 
that reference to them was now entirely irrelevant.”248 He also con-
tacted Google Spain, asking for the links to the articles in question 
to be removed so that his personal data no longer appeared in Google 
Search results.249 Google Spain forwarded the request to Google Inc. 
Subsequently, Mr. González sought the help of the Spanish Data 
Protection Agency. The latter rejected his claims against the news-
paper,250 but upheld those against Google Spain and Google Inc.251 
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Google Spain and Google Inc. separately appealed to Spain’s 
high court.252 Google Inc. argued that the company was not within 
the scope of the EU Directive 95/46/EC.253 Google Spain argued 
that it was not responsible for the algorithm of the search engine, 
since, according to the Company, its activity is limited to providing 
support to Google Inc.’s advertising activity, which is separate  
from its search engine service.254 Google Spain and Google Inc. both  
argued that there was no processing of personal data within the 
search function; that even were there processing, neither Google Inc. 
nor Google Spain could be regarded as a data controller; and that  
in any event, the data subject did not have the right to erasure of 
lawfully published material.255 Google Inc., in turn, referred to the 
ECJ, among others, the preliminary question as to whether an indi-
vidual has the right to request that their personal data be removed 
from search results.256 The ECJ ruled that the European citizens are 
entitled to request that search engines that collect personal data for 
profit, such as Google, should remove links to private information 
(e.g. a person’s full name) when asked, as long as the information is 
no longer relevant.257 Based upon this decision, Google Inc. created 
a form that enables European citizens to request to have outdated 
and irrelevant search results on European domains removed.258 The 
Court did not define exactly what is newsworthy in terms of time, 
but it seems that a ten-year time period—from 1998 to 2009—is 
enough for lay persons’ social security debts to become irrelevant 
for public interest.259 In the United States, the FCRA requires, in a 
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the data subject establishes a right that that information should no longer be linked to his 
name by means of such a list.” The 16-year period mentioned by the ECJ covers a period 
of time from the claim to the decision. Id. 
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similar way, credit agencies to remove most negative credit infor-
mation after seven years and bankruptcies after seven to ten years, 
depending on the kind of bankruptcy.260 
In Google Spain, the ECJ did not require the publisher (La  
Vanguardia) to remove the content that the plaintiff had sought to 
have deleted.261 The right to erase personal information does not  
alter the content on the web, but merely the online search results.262 
In his opinion, the Advocate General confirmed that “the Directive 
does not provide for a general right to be forgotten in the sense  
that a data subject is entitled to restrict or terminate dissemination 
of personal data that he considers to be harmful or contrary to his 
interests.”263 The resource thus does not disappear; it remains active 
and can be further circulated, although it becomes less accessible.264 
In fact, when read in tandem with the recent Google decision handed 
down by the ECJ in September 2019,265 the ruling basically applies 
to search engines within the borders of the EU the current rights to 
rectification, erasure, blocking, and objection which already existed 
in the previous Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC.266 It is not  
necessary to find that links are prejudicial to the data subject.267 The 
Court decided that the fundamental right to privacy should be con-
sidered more important than the economic interest of a commercial 
 
260 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(2) (2018). 
261 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL, at ¶¶ 16, 98. 
262 Melanie Dulong de Rosnay & Andres Guadamuz, Memory Hole or Right to Delist? 
Implications of the Right to be Forgotten for Web Archiving, 6 RESET SOCIAL SCI. RES. 
INTERNET ¶ 3 (2016). 
263 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL, at ¶ 108. 
264 Samuel W. Royston, The Right to Be Forgotten: Comparing U.S. and European 
Approaches, 48 ST. MARY’S L.J. 253, 273–74 (2016) (arguing that “de-linking is not 
censorship because the data is deleted from the search engine but not from the entire 
Internet[, which] is tantamount to allowing a book to remain on library shelves but 
redacting all of the pages”). 
265 Case C‑507/17, Google LLC v. Commission nationale de l’informatique et des 
libertés (CNIL), 2019 E.C.R. 772, ¶ 73. 
266 Melanie Dulong de Rosnay & Andres Guadamuz, supra note 262, at ¶ 26. 
267 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL, at ¶ 99 (“[I]t should inter alia be examined whether 
the data subject has a right that the information in question relating to him personally 
should, at this point in time, no longer be linked to his name by a list of results displayed 
following a search made on the basis of his name, without it being necessary in order to 
find such a right that the inclusion of the information in question in that list causes prejudice 
to the data subject.”). 
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intermediary, provided the data subject is not seen as a public person 
or a person who assumes a role in public life.268 
In the EU, the essence of commercial activity is that the offering 
of goods and/or services “must be capable of being carried on,  
at least in principle, with a view to profit.”269 Neither the legal  
status of the entity engaged in the activity nor the way in which it is 
financed affects the law’s recognition of the commercial nature of 
the activity.270 Moreover, in principle, no commerce occurs when 
the state carries performs activities that the market could not pro-
vide.271 The question as to whether the entity organization or group 
which disseminates information to the public carries out a commer-
cial activity seems to have played a central role in the field of data 
protection law. That data protection law developed via this route  
becomes apparent when Google Spain is read in tandem with Manni. 
Although both deal with the right to erase, the economic activities 
of Google differentiate this case from Manni, where a government 
agency disclosed official information about a registered business.272 
Even though the American scholarly community has not given 
close consideration to Manni, understanding this case is essential  
to forming a complete picture of the right to erase in the EU.273 In 
2007, Salvatore Manni, the sole director of a building company that 
was building a tourist complex in Italy, brought an action before the 
Italian Court of Lecce against the Lecce Chamber of Commerce.274 
 
268 Id. (“However, that would not be the case if it appeared, for particular reasons, such 
as the role played by the data subject in public life, that the interference with his 
fundamental rights is justified by the preponderant interest of the general public in having, 
on account of its inclusion in the list of results, access to the information in question.”). 
269 See Joint Cases C-180/98 and 184/98, Pavlov v. Stichting Pensioenfonds Medische 
Specialisten, Opinion of Advocate-General Jacobs ¶ 107, 2000 E.C.R. I-6451. 
270 Case C-118/85, Comm’n v. Italy, 1986 E.C.R. 413, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/
celex.jsf?celex=61985CC0118&lang1=en&type=TXT&ancre= [https://perma.cc/G5C9-
WXYQ]; Case C-35/96, Comm’n v. Italy, 1998 E.C.R. I-3851. 
271 Report on Competition in Professional Services, at ¶ 67(1), (COM) (2004) 83 final 
(Sept. 2, 2004). 
272 Case C-398/15, Camera di Commercio, Industria, Artigianato e Agricoltura di Lecce 
v. Salvatore Manni, 2016 E.C.R. 652, ¶ 24, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/ 
document/document.jsf?text=&docid=183142&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&d
ir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=3853759 [https://perma.cc/8Z25-NB83]. 
273 Id. at ¶ 26. 
274 Id. at ¶ 24. 
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He argued that the properties built in that complex were not selling 
because the company register specified that Mr. Manni had been the 
sole director and liquidator of another building company that went 
bankrupt in 1992 and was wound up in 2005.275 Mr. Manni also  
alleged that, although he asked for his personal data to be removed 
from the company register, the Chamber of Commerce had not com-
plied.276 He therefore petitioned the Court for an order requiring the 
Chamber to erase, anonymize, or block the information connecting 
him to the bankrupt company.277 He also sought compensation for 
the damage he suffered as a result of the injury to his reputation.278 
The Court of Lecce agreed with Mr. Manni’s argument that 
naming the sole director of the insolvent company which had been 
liquidated over ten years ago was neither necessary nor useful.279 
Accordingly, the Court ordered the Chamber of Commerce to  
anonymize—but not remove—the data about the Applicant’s  
involvement with the no-longer existing company.280 The Court 
stated that the company register could not permanently maintain  
the connection between a natural person and an insolvent company 
“after an appropriate period” following the liquidation, even if  
Italian law does not specify a maximum term for the retention of 
data published in the company register.281 According to the Court, 
there is no particular public interest in the disclosure of such an out-
dated information.282 Finally, the Court ordered the Chamber to pay 
compensation for the harm done to the Applicant’s reputation, in 
recognition of the fact that the latter had successfully demonstrated 
that several potential buyers had brought an end to their negotiations 
as a result of their discovery of the information regarding the  
Applicant’s involvement in the bankrupt company.283 
In 2012, the Chamber of Commerce appealed this decision  
directly to the Italian Supreme Court—the appeal concerned the  
 
275 Id. 
276 Id. at ¶ 25. 
277 Id. at ¶ 26. 
278 Id. 
279 Id. at ¶ 27. 
280 Id. 
281 Id. at ¶ 28. 
282 Id. 
283 Id. at ¶ 27. 
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interpretation of the right to erase and its limits.284 Manni raised the 
issue of how a person’s right to erase should be balanced against the 
prevailing public interest in disclosing data concerning business  
organizations.285 According to the Supreme Court, public registers, 
such as the company register, promote the creation of sound com-
mercial and social relations through providing a reliable record of 
information essential to defining the legal status of commercial  
entities and to ensuring the legal validity of their dealings.286  
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court recognized the importance of the 
right to erase, as it had been acknowledged by the ECJ in Google 
Spain, as an important method of protecting personal identity.287 
Faced with this dilemma, the Italian Supreme Court referred  
preliminary questions to the ECJ. 
In its preliminary decision, the ECJ held that the Applicant’s 
right to erase could not supersede the right of the public to be  
informed.288 Furthermore, the ECJ held that the disclosure of  
the Applicant’s personal data kept in the company register by the 
Lecce Chamber of Commerce was lawful, because registering and 
disclosing this kind of official information protects third parties.289 
The ECJ reasoned that this interference with the Applicant’s funda-
mental rights to a private life and the protection of personal data was 
not disproportionate, because company registers disclose only a  
limited amount of personal data, and because company executives 
are obligated to disclose their identity and function within a com-
pany, even one that stopped trading years ago.290 The ECJ concluded 
that, in exceptional circumstances, when the data subject proves the 
existence of overriding and legitimate reasons to withhold disclo-
sure, third parties might not be granted access to the data subject’s 
personal information found in the company register.291 However, 
 
284 Id. at ¶ 29. 
285 Id. at ¶¶ 43–44. 
286 Id. at ¶ 43. 
287 Id. at ¶ 37. 
288 Id. at ¶ 63. 
289 Id. at ¶¶ 49, 51, 60. 
290 Id. at ¶ 60. 
291 Id. at ¶ 64. 
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this exception was limited by the proviso that the company must 
have been dissolved for a sufficiently long period of time.292 
As in Google Spain, the court did not specify when a period of 
time became “sufficiently long” following the embarrassing fact, in 
this case the dissolution of the Applicant’s company. The ECJ held 
that, given the circumstances, it was not possible to identify an  
appropriate maximum retention period regarding personal data kept 
in publicly available registers.293 Unlike U.S. law, EU law does not 
include any explicit regulation of personal data collected in public 
registers.294 In the United States, the Federal Privacy Act establishes 
a Code of Fair Information Practice295 that governs the collection, 
maintenance, use, and dissemination of personal identifiable infor-
mation about individuals that is maintained in systems of records by 
federal agencies.296 In the absence of a comparable privacy act at the 
EU level, the ECJ would have had to define the legitimate reasons 
for preventing the disclosure of information contained in the public 
record if it had ruled in favor of the Applicant. However, the ECJ 
did not address this issue, because it concluded that third parties  
had an overriding interest in having access to the public records  
regarding the Applicant’s previous dealings and business history.297 
 
292 Id. 
293 Id. at ¶ 60. 
294 Even if there is no regulation at the EU level, member states have adopted fair 
information practices as law. See, e.g., Directive 1995/46 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 
31–51 (EC). 
295 For the evolution of Fair Information Practices (FIPs), see generally ROBERT 
GELLMAN, FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES: A BASIC HISTORY 1 (Apr. 10, 2017), 
https://bobgellman.com/rg-docs/rg-FIPshistory.pdf [https://perma.cc/2B4C-D59P]. 
296 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012); see generally Marc Rotenberg, Fair Information Practices 
and the Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn’t Get), 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1 
(2001). 
297 Case C-398/15, Camera di Commercio, Industria, Artigianato e Agricoltura di Lecce 
v. Salvatore Manni, 2016 E.C.R. 652, ¶¶ 32, 50, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/
document.jsf?text=&docid=183142&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=f
irst&part=1&cid=3853759 [https://perma.cc/8Z25-NB83]. 
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In the EU, official public records of company details required by 
law are meant to show, at a glance, the whole history and manage-
ment of a company as correctly and as objectively as possible.298 
Disclosing such records to the public, official registers are well  
positioned to play a neutral intermediary role in ensuring openness, 
transparency, and public availability of company data. This  
approach mirrors the one found in many states’ public record acts299 
as well as in court opinions in the United States.300 
The register is not the source of the information it provides and 
it has no control over the content of the information registered; its 
 
298 See Directive 2009/101, art. 2, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
September 2009 on Coordination Of Safeguards Which, For The Protection Of The 
Interests Of Members And Third Parties, Are Required By Member States Of Companies 
Within The Meaning Of The Second Paragraph Of Article 48 Of The Treaty, With A View 
To Making Such Safeguards Equivalent, 2009 O.J. (L 258/11) 11–19 (EC) [hereinafter 
Directive 2009/101] (“Member States shall take the measures required to ensure 
compulsory disclosure by companies as referred to in Article 1 of at least the following 
documents and particulars: (a) the instrument of constitution, and the statutes if they are 
contained in a separate instrument; (b) any amendments to the instruments mentioned in 
point (a), including any extension of the duration of the company; (c) after every 
amendment of the instrument of constitution or of the statutes, the complete text of the 
instrument or statutes as amended to date; (d) the appointment, termination of office and 
particulars of the persons who either as a body constituted pursuant to law or as members 
of any such body: (i) are authorised to represent the company in dealings with third parties 
and in legal proceedings; it must be apparent from the disclosure whether the persons 
authorised to represent the company may do so alone or must act jointly; (ii) take part in 
the administration, supervision or control of the company; (e) at least once a year, the 
amount of the capital subscribed, where the instrument of constitution or the statutes 
mention an authorised capital, unless any increase in the capital subscribed necessitates an 
amendment of the statutes; (f) the accounting documents for each financial year which are 
required to be published . . . ; (h) the winding-up of the company; (i) any declaration of 
nullity of the company by the courts; (j) the appointment of liquidators, particulars 
concerning them, and their respective powers, unless such powers are expressly and 
exclusively derived from law or from the statutes of the company; (k) the termination of 
the liquidation and, in Member States where striking off the register entails legal 
consequences, the fact of any such striking off.”). 
299 See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 6252(e) (2016) (defining the term “public records” 
broadly as “information relating to the conduct of the public’s business [that is] prepared, 
owned, used, or retained by any state or local agency regardless of the physical form or 
characteristics”). 
300 See, e.g., Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 472–73 (1975) (allowing 
publication of rape victim’s name already available in a criminal indictment). 
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only function is to enable third parties to ascertain information con-
cerning the company in question.301 That point distinguishes Manni 
from Google Spain. In fact, search engines do not have a passive 
attitude regarding information they make accessible.302 Unlike  
public registers, search engines not only collect information from its 
source, but they also process the data.303 On the basis of the  
algorithm they are using, search engines, as profit-making entities, 
refer only to certain web pages and data fields, and in a particular 
order when a specific term or name is entered.304 In 2006, AOL  
imprudently released the search habits of 657,426 Internet users.305 
The records revealed the following: 
90 percent of the total clicks went to sites on the first 
page of results; 
74 percent of clicks went to the top five search  
results; 
the top result alone received 42 percent of all 
clicks.306 
 
301 Directive 2009/101, supra note 298, at recital 3. 
302 For an empirical approach, see Sounman Hong, Does Google Distort Your ‘Click’? 
Search Engines and the Emergence of Internet Monopolies 22 (June 23, 2016), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2799664 [https://perma.cc/C497-Y4U6] (“[T]his study offered 
suggestive but compelling empirical evidence that search engines at least somewhat 
contribute to the emergence of Internet monopolies.”). 
303 The ECJ defined in Google Spain the activity of a search engine as follows:  
[I]n exploring the internet automatically, constantly and systematically 
in search of the information which is published there, the operator of a 
search engine ‘collects’ such data which it subsequently ‘retrieves,’ 
‘records,’ and ‘organizes’ within the framework of its indexing 
programmes, ‘stores’ on its servers and, as the case may be, ‘discloses’ 
and ‘makes available’ to its users in the form of lists of search results.  
Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos, Mario 
Costeja Gonzalez, 2014 E.C.R. 317, at ¶ 28. 
304 See Florent Thouvenin, Peter Hettich, Herbert Burkert & Urs Gasser, Remembering 
and Forgetting in the Digital Age, 38 L. GOV. & TECH. SERIES 59, 62 (2018). 
305 Following this incidence, AOL removed the search data from its site and apologized 
for its release. See Michael Barbaro & Tom Zeller Jr., Web Searchers’ Identities Traced 
on AOL, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2006), www.nytimes.com/2006/08/09/technology/08cnd-
aol.html [https://perma.cc/8RJ4-WFW5]. 
306 MATTHEW HINDMAN, THE MYTH OF DIGITAL DEMOCRACY 69 (2009). 
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These figures, confirmed by more recent studies,307 show that 
search engine rankings affect the user’s behavior. Higher ranked 
results tend to attract more attention and, therefore, have a higher 
chance of being accessed, whereas low ranked results may not  
be visited even if they are more relevant to the user’s information 
need. This makes us understand why search engines, just like  
social media platforms, have a crucial role not only in forming  
attitudes on topics ranging from fingernail care trends to presidential 
elections, but also in influencing a person’s perception of others and 
the judgments he or she formulates regarding them.308 
Of course, this process of mutual influence alone cannot be held 
as evidence conclusive enough to apply the right to erasure. The ECJ 
pays close attention to the nature of the information in question, the 
public’s interest in that information’s disclosure, and the possible 
impact of such disclosure when determining whether or not the  
information in question may be made publicly available.309 Here, 
too, it is possible to draw a parallel between the two sides of the 
Atlantic. In Reporters Committee, the Supreme Court applied a test 
similar to the one applied by the ECJ in order to answer the question 
of whether “rap sheets” compiled by the FBI were subject to disclo-
sure upon a request made pursuant to the Freedom of Information 
Act (“FOIA”).310 The Court opined that “the fact that an event is not 
wholly “private” does not mean that an individual has no interests 
in limiting disclosure or dissemination of the information,”311 and 
 
307 Advanced Web Ranking has released a study showing fresh data on the click-through-
rate from Google’s organic search results. The data was taken from Google Webmaster 
Tools Search Queries reports from large accounts back in July 2014. On average, 71.33% 
of searches resulted in a page one Google organic click. Pages two and three get only 5.59% 
of the clicks. On the first page alone, the first five results account for 67.60% of all the 
clicks and results six to ten account for only 3.73%. See Philip Petrescu, Google Organic 
CTR—2014 Report, ADVANCED WEB RANKING BLOG (Apr. 15, 2019), www.advanced
webranking.com/blog/google-organic-ctr/ [https://perma.cc/2U28-UCYK]. 
308 Jeffrey Rosen, The Deciders: The Future of Privacy and Free Speech in the Age of 
Facebook and Google, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1525, 1535 (2012). 
309 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos, 2014 
E.C.R. 317, ¶ 81. 
310 See Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 772 
(1989). 
311 Id. at 770 (quoting William Rehnquist, Is an Expanded Right of Privacy Consistent 
with Fair and Effective Law Enforcement?, KAN. L. SCH. pt. 1, p. 13 (Sept. 26, 1974)). 
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determined that “whether disclosure of a private document under  
the Freedom of Information Act [(“FOIA”)] Exemption 7(C) is  
warranted must turn on the nature of the requested document.”312  
In this case, the Court concluded that “[t]he privacy interest in a rap 
sheet is substantial. The substantial character of that interest is  
affected by the fact that in today’s society the computer can accu-
mulate and store information that would otherwise have surely been  
forgotten long before a person attains age eighty, when the FBI’s 
rap sheets are discarded.”313 
Keeping in mind the results the European courts reached in  
various cases, it is clear that, at the EU level, there is no possible 
pre-determined hierarchy between the protection of private life and 
that of freedom of expression. Both rights are worthy of equal  
respect, and it is impossible to draw a bright line between pri-
vacy/data protection and the public’s right to know.314 Indeed, as it 
can be seen in several judgments rendered before Google Spain  
as well, on the basis of Articles 7 and 8 of the EU Charter of the 
Fundamental Rights, neither the right to erase nor the right to  
freedom of expression is absolute.315 The exercise of both rights  
depends on many variables and each request will have to be evalu-
ated individually.316 This phenomenon leads some commentators to 
 
312 Id. at 750. 
313 Id. at 771.  
314 Stefan Kulk & Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius, Privacy, Freedom of Expression, and 
the Right to Be Forgotten in Europe, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CONSUMER PRIVACY 
320 (Jules Polonetsky & Omer Tene & Evan Selinger eds., 2018), https://pure.uva.nl/ws/
files/9113768/Kulk_Zuiderveen_Borgesius_RTBF_chapter_2Feb2017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7DUK-EQ9P]. 
315 Case C-92/09, Volker und Markus Schecke GbR v. Land Hessen, 2010 E.C.R. I-
11063, ¶ 48; Case C-543/09, Deutsche Telekom AG v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 2011 
E.C.R. 279, ¶ 51, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A6200
9CJ0543 [https://perma.cc/2BXJ-VB7C]; Case C-291/12, Michael Schwarz v. Stadt 
Bochum, 2013 E.C.R. 401, ¶ 33, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/celex.jsf?celex=62012CC029
1&lang1=en&type=TXT&ancre= [https://perma.cc/5KLM-QWL2]. 
316 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos, 2014 
E.C.R. 317, ¶ 81 (“[I]nasmuch as the removal of links from the list of results could, 
depending on the information at issue, have effects upon the legitimate interest of internet 
users potentially interested in having access to that information, in situations such as that 
at issue in the main proceedings a fair balance should be sought in particular between that 
interest and the data subject’s fundamental rights.”). 
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think that the conditions to exercise these rights are vague in  
the EU.317 
However, one thing is clear: in the EU, individuals are entitled 
to choose which aspects of their personal lives should be private and 
protected against outside interferences, unless compelling reasons 
justify restricting that right in certain areas of life or in specific  
situations.318 Searching for the name of a specific individual “ena-
bles any Internet user to obtain through the list of results a structured 
overview of the information . . . that can be found on the Internet . . . 
and which, without the search engine, could not have been intercon-
nected or could have been only with great difficulty—and thereby 
to establish a more or less detailed profile.”319 In other words, the 
search engine plays a crucial role in the dissemination of infor-
mation, and search service providers have an economic interest in 
such activity.320 The ECJ ruled that, neither the search service  
provider’s interest in profit-making nor the public’s hypothetical  
interest in outdated and irrelevant information—disclosure of which 
is facilitated by the search engine—can be deemed a good enough 
reason to interfere with individual self-determination.321 
Nevertheless, as the Court of Amsterdam stated in a case where 
it was asked to apply the Google Spain ruling, that rule “does not 
intend to protect individuals against all negative communications on 
 
317 See Miquel Peguera, The Shaky Ground of the Right to Be Delisted, 18 VAND. J. ENT. 
& TECH. L. 560 (2016). 
318 See ECHR, supra note 55, art. 8 (“Right to Respect for Private and Family Life:  
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of 
this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the 
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or 
for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”) 
319 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL, at ¶ 80. 
320 For some, this means that search engines inevitably influencing the results they 
display to individuals can be held responsible for selecting the information that is made 
available to Internet users. In this vein, see Aleksandra Kuczerawy & Jef Ausloos, NoC 
Online Intermediaries Case Studies Series: European Union and Google Spain, INTERDISC. 
CTR FOR L. & ICT (ICRI), KU LEUVEN 22 (2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2567183 [https://perma.cc/V9WN-L98M]. 
321 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos, 2014 
E.C.R. 317, ¶¶ 81, 99. 
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the Internet, but only against ‘being pursued’ for a long time by  
‘irrelevant’, ‘excessive’ or ‘unnecessarily defamatory’ expres-
sions.”322 Manni is a good example of this limitation. In this case, 
the ECJ ruled that, unlike the service offered by Google, the service 
of a public register providing official and objective information 
about the situation of a business cannot be considered intrusive into 
private life.323 
This decision should not be seen as contradicting Google Spain. 
Although the categorical distinction between things private and 
things public has been more recently developed and less clearly  
formulated in American law than it has been in continental legal  
traditions,324 everyone in both jurisdictions is entitled to access to 
official records,325 albeit subject to certain limitations, and this right 
of access is seen as one of the fundamental elements of a representa-
tive form of government.326 Manni reflects this policy. A business 
 
322 ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2014:6118, 18 Sept. 2014, C/13/569654 / KG ZA 14–960, 
https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2014:6118 
[https://perma.cc/WD3G-7QM7]. For a comment, see Joran Spauwen & Jens van den 
Brink, Dutch Google Spain Ruling: More Freedom of Speech, Less Right to Be Forgotten 
for Criminals, INFORRM’S BLOG (Sept. 27, 2014), https://inforrm.org/2014/09/27/dutch-
google-spain-ruling-more-freedom-of-speech-less-right-to-be-forgotten-for-criminals-
joran-spauwen-and-jens-van-den-brink/ [https://perma.cc/PMF3-JKU]. 
323 Case C-398/15, Camera di Commercio, Industria, Artigianato e Agricoltura di Lecce 
v. Salvatore Manni, 2016 E.C.R. 652, ¶ 43. 
324 Chaim Saiman, Public Law, Private Law, and Legal Science, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 691, 
692 (2009) (“Despite more than a century of critique and deconstruction, the distinction 
between private and public law continues to influence the structure of legal thought in the 
civil law world, and of late, these categories have even migrated to common law 
systems.”). 
325 It nevertheless is true that, in Europe, the distinction is getting blurred in practice. See 
JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE: AN 
INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY 27 (Thomas Burger trans., with the 
assistance of Frederick Lawrence, 1989). 
326 See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 552.000(a) (West 2019) (“Under the fundamental philosophy 
of the American constitutional form of representative government that adheres to the 
principle that government is the servant and not the master of the people, it is the policy of 
this state that each person is entitled, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, at all 
times to complete information about the affairs of government and the official acts of 
public officials and employees. The people, in delegating authority, do not give their public 
servants the right to decide what is good for the people to know and what is not good for 
them to know. The people insist on remaining informed so that they may retain control 
over the instruments they have created. The provisions of this chapter shall be liberally 
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owner, whose business is registered with the public company regis-
ter, normally has no reasonable expectation of confidentiality in  
respect of that business’s financial records.327 
2. Statistical Inference 
Approximately 5.5 billion searches are conducted each day with 
Google’s search engine.328 According to the Transparency Report, 
which Google publishes each year, the company received 800,000 
requests between May 2014 and May 2019 from EU citizens wish-
ing to remove links to personal information from its index, which 
would entail deleting approximately three million URLs.329 Even if, 
at first sight, the number of such requests (an average of 600,000 
per year) seems high, the impact of delisting on the free speech of 
citizens is extremely limited. Google assesses each request on a 
case-by-case basis. It is not compelled to accept all requests, and 
does not do so. Arguably, “Google is a biased party, as its failure to 
comply with the ruling leaves one percent of its global revenues at 
stake[,] . . . [which creates] strong incentives to overreach and  
remove links that do not deserve to be taken down.”330 
What is sure is that this regime favoring self-regulation permits 
the search engine company to operate as a private administrative 
 
construed to implement this policy.”); see also ALAN CHARLES RAUL, PRIVACY AND THE 
DIGITAL STATE: BALANCING PUBLIC INFORMATION AND PERSONAL PRIVACY 37 (2002). 
327 In the United States, some states like Delaware permit a limited liability company 
(LLC) to be set up without providing state officials the name of the members and managers. 
See, e.g., 6 DEL. CODE § 18–305 (2015). LLCs are required to include their own ownership 
information with tax filings. However, those documents are not public. Indeed, IRC 
Section 6103 generally protects tax return information from disclosure to other parties by 
an IRS employee. See Disclosure Laws, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/government-entities/
federal-state-local-governments/disclosure-laws [https://perma.cc/D2PB-MTF9].  
328 Google Annual Search Statistics, STAT. BRAIN RES. INST., https://www.statisticbrain.
com/google-searches/ [https://perma.cc/FVM2-CLP7]; see also Danny Sullivan, Google 
Now Handles at Least 2 Trillion Searches Per Year, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (May 24, 2016, 
12:00 PM), https://searchengineland.com/google-now-handles-2-999-trillion-searches-
per-year-250247 [https://perma.cc/R28G-QZXM]. 
329 Transparency Report: Search Removals Under European Privacy Law, GOOGLE, 
https://transparencyreport.google.com/eu-privacy/overview?hl=en 
[https://perma.cc/84UX-LR5A]. 
330 Steven M. LoCascio, Forcing Europe to Wear the Rose-Colored Google Glass: The 
“Right to Be Forgotten” and the Struggle to Manage Compliance Post, 54 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 297, 329 (2015). 
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agency,331 which in effect administers public rights on the basis  
of factors such as the existence of alternative solutions, technical 
reasons, or duplicate URLs.332 The newsworthiness of the infor-
mation from a public interest point of view also plays a role in the 
company’s decision making on removal requests.333 According to 
Google’s presentation of the results of this evaluation process in  
a transparency report,334 the search engine company refused to  
remove URLs in 55.6% of the cases between May 2014 and May 
2019.335 This means that the average number of the pages actually 
removed per year is only slightly more than 250,000. Google has 
accepted all of the removal requests in those cases (14.2% of the 
total requests) where no reference to the requester’s name can be 
found in the content page at the provided URL, even though the  
individual’s name appears in the URL.336 When we subtract these 
35,500 cases which have absolutely no impact on free speech from 
the total number of pages that were removed, the number of the  
removed pages whose content includes the requester’s name gets 
even smaller: about 215,000 pages per year. 
Ultimately, the number of removed pages mentioned above  
corresponds to one very small fraction of the total pages indexed by 
 
331 Edward Lee, Recognizing Rights in Real Time: The Role of Google in the EU Right 
to Be Forgotten, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1017, 1072 (2016). 
332 The power given to the search engine to determine which links should be erased has 
been criticized on different bases. A commentator wrote that “[this] is reinforcing the 
dangerous trend toward privatized online censorship.” See Félix Tréguer, Right to Be 
Forgotten: With Free Expression Under Threat, Europe Needs a ‘Marco Civil Moment,’ 
GLOBAL VOICES (Nov. 9, 2014, 5:45 PM), https://globalvoices.org/2014/09/11/right-to-be-
forgotten-with-free-expression-under-threat-europe-needs-a-marco-civil-moment/ 
[https://perma.cc/DKR3-TWBW]. Another commentator wrote that “the [ECJ] was less 
clear about how Google, or other search engines, should determine which removal requests 
to honor.” Daphne Keller, The Right Tools: Europe’s Intermediary Liability Laws and the 
EU 2016 General Data Protection Regulation, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 297, 314 (2018). 
333 See Transparency Report, supra note 329.  
334 In May 2015, eighty academics addressed a letter to Google, asking for more 
transparency about its evaluation processes. See Ellen P. Goodman, Open Letter to Google 
from 80 Internet Scholars: Release RTBF Compliance Data, MEDIUM (May 13, 2015), 
https://medium.com/@ellgood/open-letter-to-google-from-80-internet-scholars-release-
rtbf-compliance-data-cbfc6d59f1bd [https://perma.cc/B4J7-MFYB]. 
335 Transparency Report, supra note 329. 
336 Id. 
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Google, which exceeded 130 trillion pages in 2016.337 The removed 
links represent less than 0.0000002% of the pages to which Google 
offers access. This number is so small that it is hard to  
believe that the ECJ’s ruling has “foray[ed] into the significance  
of communication on the Internet,”338 or “unearth[ed] a myriad of 
global media law issues,”339 or “effectuat[ed] international censor-
ship in the guise of privacy.”340 On the contrary, the figures  
mentioned above demonstrate that, in the EU, the right to privacy 
coexists with the right to information and with freedom of expres-
sion. The case law of the ECJ restricts the exercise of the right to 
erase in circumstances, where the dissemination of information 
about an individual constitutes an intrusion into a private matter 
without sufficient countervailing public benefits.341 
If we believe, like many commentators, that the removal of  
a number smaller than 0.0000002% of all the indexed pages is large 
enough to infringe freedom of information or freedom of expression, 
we should also file complaints against the companies, public author-
ities, and website operators gathering and disclosing information for 
missing links or websites which cover matters being of public  
interest. Indeed, 85% of content disappears within a year and 59% 
within a week for a number of reasons342: websites are refreshed 
every couple of years to keep current with advancements, companies 
are taken over or go out of business, websites are blocked by  
 
337 In November 2016, Google mentioned in the “How Google Search Works” page that 
it had indexed 130 trillion pages. That figure is up by 100 trillion pages from when Google 
announced 30 trillion pages in March 2013. The company has not shared any newer 
number. Taking into account the increase of 333% from 2013 to 2016, the number of 
indexed pages should be much more than 130 trillion pages today. See How Google Search 
Works, Crawling & Indexing, GOOGLE, www.google.com/search/howsearchworks/
crawling-indexing/ [https://perma.cc/FT2V-YVTZ]. 
338 Post, supra note 35, at 1071. 
339 BYRUM, supra note 36, at xiii. 
340 McKay Cunningham, Free Expression, Privacy, and Diminishing Sovereignty in the 
Information Age: The Internationalization of Censorship, 69 ARK. L. REV. 71, 114 (2016). 
341 Case C-131/12, Google Spain v. Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos, 2014 
E.C.R. 317, ¶ 81; Case C-398/15, Camera di Commercio, Industria, Artigianato e 
Agricoltura di Lecce v. Salvatore Manni, 2016 E.C.R. 652, ¶¶ 47, 64, http://curia.europa.
eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=183142&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&
mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=3853759 [https://perma.cc/8Z25-NB83]. 
342 Meg Leta Ambrose, It’s About Time: Privacy, Information Life Cycles, and the Right 
to Be Forgotten, 16 STAN. TECH. L.J. 101, 101 (2013). 
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governments or by ISPs, shut down by copy-right holders enforcing 
their rights, or sometimes links get broken,343 content gets overwrit-
ten for technical reasons even before information is archived.344 
The number of broken or lost web pages is much higher than  
that of deliberately removed web pages containing personal data. 
Oceans of scholarly ink have been spilled on the “inappropriate-
ness” of Google Spain, whose impact is much less important.345  
Yet, curiously, there is very little—perhaps no—popular reaction  
indicating that this “lost content” prevents people from developing 
the “public opinion that is essential to a democracy.”346 
Data privacy issues are not limited to the public disclosure of 
embarrassing private facts. There are other types of breaches which 
undermine the authority of the individual to decide herself or him-
self, on the basis of the idea of self-determination, when and within 
what limits information about her or his private life should be  
communicated to others.347 Some numbers recently cited by the 
 
343 The average website lifespan is two years and seven months. See Andy Crestodina, 
What Is the Average Website Lifespan? 10 Factors in Website Life Expectancy, ORBIT 
MEDIA STUDIOS, www.orbitmedia.com/blog/website-lifespan-and-you/ [https://perma.cc/
RH5R-PCVQ]. 
344 PAUL BERNAL, THE INTERNET, WARTS AND ALL: FREE SPEECH PRIVACY AND TRUTH 30 
(2018). 
345 See, e.g., Wilbur Ross, EU Data Privacy Laws Are Likely to Create Barriers to Trade, 
FIN. TIMES (May 30, 2018, 12:42 PM), www.ft.com/content/9d261f44-6255-11e8-bdd1-
cc0534df682c; Bromund, supra note 37; BYRUM, supra note 36, at 111–12 (2018); see 
generally David Erdos, European Union Data Protection Law and Media Expression: 
Fundamentally Off Balance, 65 INT’L COMP. L.Q. 139 (2016); Emily Adams Shoor, 
Narrowing the Right to Be Forgotten: Why the European Union Needs to Amend the 
Proposed Data Protection Regulation, 39 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 487 (2014); Patricia Sánchez 
Abril & Jacqueline D. Lipton, The Right to Be Forgotten: Who Decides What the World 
Forgets, 103 KY. L.J. 363487 (2014); Sophie Curtis & Alice Philipson, Wikipedia 
Founder: EU’s Right to Be Forgotten Is “Deeply Immoral,” TELEGRAPH (Aug. 6, 2014, 
12:07 PM), www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/wikipedia/11015901/EU-ruling-on-link-
removal-deeply-immoral-says-Wikipedia-founder.html [https://perma.cc/PSM9-L795]; 
LoCascio, supra note 330; Bromund, supra note 37. 
346 Post, supra note 35, at 1042. 
347 Personal information can contain financial information such as credit card 
information, the disclosure of which can cause financial loss to the user. It can also contain 
other information such as political affiliation or medical records, the disclosure of which 
can result in non-financial loss such as injury to feelings. See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz & 
Daniel J. Solove, Reconciling Personal Information in the United States and European 
Union, 102 CAL. L. REV. 877, 888–89 (2014). In the United States, the definition of 
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CPO (Chief Privacy Officer) Magazine give an idea about the  
magnitude of the major data breaches so far348:  
 
Company Accounts Hacked Date of Hack 
Yahoo! 3 billion Aug. 2013 
Marriott 500 million 2014–2018 
Yahoo! 500 million Late 2014 
Adult FriendFinder 412 million Oct. 2016 
MySpace 360 million May 2016 
Under Armor 150 million Feb. 2018 
Equifax 145.5 million July 2017 
Ebay 145 million May 2014 
Target 110 million Nov. 2013 
Heartland Payment Systems 100+ million May 2008 
LinkedIn 100 million June 2012 
Rambler.ru 98 million Feb. 2012 
TJX 94 million 2003–2004 
AOL 92 million 2004 
 
personal information varies by the specific jurisdiction and law. In the EU, Article 4(1)  
of the GDPR defines “personal data” very broadly as “any information relating to an 
identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’).” GDPR, supra note 17, art. 4(1). 
348 Matt Powell, 11 Eye Opening Cyber Security Statistics for 2019, CPO MAG. (June 25, 
2019), www.cpomagazine.com/cyber-security/11-eye-opening-cyber-security-statistics-
for-2019/ [https://perma.cc/7T6M-7TRN]. 
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Company Accounts Hacked Date of Hack 
MyHeritage 92 million Oct. 2017 
Sony PlayStation Network 77 million Apr. 2011 
JP Morgan Chase 83 million July 2014 
Tumblr 65 million Feb. 2013 
Uber 57 million Late 2016 
Home Depot 53 million Apr. 2014 
Facebook 50 million July 2017 
Taking into account the total number of people using the  
services provided by each of the companies listed above (e.g. Uber 
has around 75 million users),349 the number of hacked accounts  
corresponds to a significant proportion of the users (e.g. 57 million 
for Uber) and thus represents a grave problem. For all of these  
service companies, the proportion of the number of victims of mass 
data hacks (e.g. 76% for Uber) is considerably higher than the 
0.0000002% of pages actually deleted as a result of Google Spain. 
This disparity suggests that the real issue in the context of data  
privacy is the data consent policies which do not give users enough 
control over the way their information is collected and processed, 
and ultimately the mass violation of personal autonomy, rather than 
the violation of freedom of expression and the implications of the 
right to be de-indexed. 
B. Practical Concerns and Approaches in the United States 
In the United States, one of the most common arguments courts 
rely on to dismiss invasion of privacy claims arising from data 
breaches is the absence of sufficient evidence proving direct or  
 
349 See Uber by the Numbers: Users & Drivers Statistics, Demographics, and Fun Facts, 
MUCH NEEDED, https://muchneeded.com/uber-statistics/ [https://perma.cc/FH7E-GVJ8]. 
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actual harm,350 since most data breach cases are based solely on 
speculative future harm.351 
In In re U.S. Office of Personnel Management Data Security 
Breach Litigation (“AFGE v. OPM”), where lawsuits were filed on 
the basis of the Privacy Act of 1974 against the Office of Personnel 
Management (“OPM”) over data breaches compromising the  
records of 22 million federal employees, the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Columbia acknowledged the “troubling allegations” 
raised by OPM’s victims.352 Nevertheless, the court ruled that “the 
fact that a person’s data was taken [is not] enough by itself to create 
standing to sue.”353 In In re Science Applications International 
Corp., the same court stated that “the degree by which the risk of 
harm has increased is irrelevant [to standing]—instead, the question 
is whether the harm is certainly impending.”354 
In spite of a general tendency to support disclosure, American 
courts, just like European courts, have nevertheless consistently  
protected personal information—or the “intimate details of one’s 
private life”—whose release could cause the individual personal  
distress or embarrassment.355 For instance, on June 21, 2019,  
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed 
the district court’s order in AFGE v. OPM granting dismissal of  
the complaints discussed above, holding that the plaintiffs’ allega-
tions of potential “future harm” were sufficient for the case to 
move forward.356 
 
350 Aranda v. Caribbean Cruise Line, Inc., 202 F. Supp. 3d 850, 855–56 (N.D. Ill. 2016) 
(citing Smith v. Ohio State Univ., 191 F. Supp. 3d 750 (S.D. Ohio 2016); Gubala v. Time 
Warner Cable, Inc., No. 15-cv-1078-pp, 2016 WL 3390415, at *1 (E.D. Wisc. June 17, 
2016); Khan v. Children’s Nat’l Health Sys., 188 F. Supp. 3d 524 (D. Md. 2016). 
351 Khan, 188 F. Supp. 3d, at 529. 
352 In re U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt. Data Sec. Breach Litig., 266 F. Supp. 3d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 
2017). 
353 Id. at 9. The court reasoned that it was “constrained to find that plaintiffs cannot 
predicate standing on the basis of the breach alone.” Id. at 20. 
354 In re Sci. Applications Int’l Corp. (SAIC) Backup Tape Data Theft Litig., 45 F. Supp. 
3d 14, 25 (D.D.C. 2014). 
355 Personal information was described by the California Court of Appeal as the “intimate 
details of one’s private life.” Wasser v. San Diego Union, 191 Cal. App. 3d 1455, 1460 
(1987). 
356 In re United States Office of Pers. Mgmt. Data Sec. Breach Litig., 928 F.3d 42, 59 
(D.C. Cir. 2019). 
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The decisions American courts have made can be divided in two 
main categories: (1) collection and use of private information by 
government agencies on the basis of the Fourth Amendment, the 
FOIA,357 and the Privacy Act of 1974358; and (2) collection and  
use of private information by private individuals. A simultaneous 
analysis of both categories will produce a global picture of the prac-
tical concerns and approaches of American courts that reveals them 
to be remarkably similar to the concerns and approaches of the ECJ. 
First, I will focus on the balance between access to public  
records by government agencies and the privacy rights of the  
individuals whose personal information is in those records. As in  
Europe, there is a widespread understanding in the United States that 
the “open public record allows citizens to oversee their government, 
facilitates a vibrant economy, improves efficiency, reduces costs, 
creates jobs, and provides valuable products and services that people 
want.”359 According to a paper published by the Center for Democ-
racy and Technology, public records in the United States include 
driver’s license, driving records, motor vehicle registration, land  
titles, property tax records, voting registration records, occupational 
licenses, use licenses (e.g. ham radio, CB radio), firearm permits, 
court records, bankruptcy filings, civil actions, criminal histories, 
divorces, docket information, juror information, wills, law enforce-
ment records, police blotters, jail lists, compiled criminal history 
records, political contributions, securities and exchange commission 
filings, financial disclosure filings, hunting and fishing licenses, 
boat, aircraft and other vehicle titles, and U.S. postal service  
address records.360 
While providing a broad right of access to these documents  
in the possession of the executive branch of the federal government, 
the FOIA serves as the vehicle for discovering and reporting  
numerous matters of public interest. Although no specific EU law 
 
357 See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2018). 
358 See id. § 552a. 
359 FRED H. CATE & RICHARD J. VARN, THE PUBLIC RECORD: INFORMATION PRIVACY AND 
ACCESS: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR FINDING THE BALANCE 1, 5 (1999), available at 
https://it.ojp.gov/documents/d/Public_Record.pdf [https://perma.cc/VN2G-UL84]. 
360 Robert Gellman, Public Records—Access, Privacy and Public Policy: A Discussion 
Paper, 12 GOV’T INFO. Q. 391, 392 (1995). 
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resembles the FOIA, Manni makes clear that the compilation of a 
public register providing official data about an objective situation 
cannot, except in specific circumstances, be deemed intrusive into 
private life.361 Thus the ECJ’s case law shows that the Court’s  
approach resembles that of the FOIA. 
According to the ECJ’s ruling, even after a sufficiently long  
period of time has elapsed since the specific case in question, only a 
few, overriding reasons justify limiting third party access to personal 
data.362 The FOIA creates exemptions that address the need for  
privacy, in a way similar to the Manni ruling, and finds a middle 
ground.363 The justification of this limitation lies in the need for  
certain files held by the federal government, which contain infor-
mation personal enough in nature that its disclosure would very 
likely constitute an “unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,” to 
be protected against disclosure.364 Public access to official records 
is thus a conditional right in both the United States and in the EU. 
A few decisions handed down by American courts reflect the 
tensions and complexities regarding the public’s interest in both  
access to public records and personal privacy. In Associated Press, 
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided, on the basis of 
FOIA Exemption 6, that Guantanamo Bay detainees and their  
family members have a “measurable privacy interest” in the nondis-
closure of their names and identifying information contained in  
records regarding allegations of abuse by military personnel and 
other detainees.365 The Court highlighted that “a detainee might 
want to voluntarily disclose information publicly does not authorize 
the government to disclose that information.”366 
 
361 Case C-398/15, Camera di Commercio, Industria, Artigianato e Agricoltura di Lecce 
v. Salvatore Manni, 2016 E.C.R. 652, ¶ 63, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/ 
document.jsf?text=&docid=183142&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=f
irst&part=1&cid=3853759 [https://perma.cc/8Z25-NB83]. 
362 Id. at ¶ 60. 
363 See Martin E. Halstuk & Bill F. Chamberlin, The Freedom of Information Act 1966–
2006: A Retrospective on the Rise of Privacy Protection over the Public Interest in 
Knowing What the Government’s Up to, 11 COMM. L. & POL’Y 511, 511 (2006). 
364 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (2016). 
365 Associated Press v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 554 F.3d 274, 274–79 (2d Cir. 2009). 
366 Id. at 287. 
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According to the U.S. Justice Department, courts regularly rule 
against the disclosure of sensitive personal information regarding 
marital status, legitimacy of children, welfare payments, family 
fights and reputation, medical condition, date of birth, religious  
affiliation, citizenship data, social security numbers, criminal  
history records, incarceration of U.S. citizens in foreign prisons, 
sexual inclinations or associations, and financial status.367 With  
regard to financial status, even though corporations have no privacy 
rights, personal financial information is nevertheless protected—
particularly information concerning small businesses when the  
individual and corporation are identical.368 In Veneman, a Texan 
court ruled that the Department of Agriculture had incorrectly  
considered individuals participating in a USDA program as “busi-
nesses” because of their ownership of a certain number of livestock 
or because of the fact that their ranch had a name.369 The court  
concluded that personally identifying information about those  
individuals should not be disclosed.370 
Disclosing lists of names, telephone numbers, and email  
addresses of individuals has frequently been the reason behind  
privacy litigation.371 Courts have in effect established a non-official 
nondisclosure rule regarding the public release of mailing lists. The 
D.C. Circuit, for instance, ruled that mailing lists with the names  
and home addresses of federal annuitants were categorically nondis-
closable under FOIA’s privacy exemption.372 The Supreme Court 
 
367 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., GUIDE TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT, EXEMPTION 
6, 480 (2014), available at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/
07/23/exemption6_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/W65B-2LMY]. 
368 See, e.g., Providence Journal Co. v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 460 F. Supp. 778, 
785 (D.R.I. 1978), rev’d on other grounds, 602 F.2d 1010 (1st Cir. 1979); Beard v. Espy, 
No. 94-16748, 1995 WL 792071, at *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 11, 1995); Nat’l Parks & 
Conservation Ass’n v. Kleppe, 547 F.2d 673, 685–86 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Okla. Publ’g Co. 
v. HUD, No. Civ-87-1935-P, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18643, at *4–5 (W.D. Okla. June 17, 
1988); DEP’T OF JUST., FOIA UPDATE, VOL. III, NO. 4, 5 (1982), https://www.justice.gov/
oip/blog/foia-update-foia-counselor-questions-answers-24 [https://perma.cc/EZ6M-
DRKG]. 
369 Doe v. Veneman, 230 F. Supp. 2d 739, 750 (W.D. Tex. 2002), aff’d in pertinent part 
on other grounds, 380 F.3d 807, 818 (5th Cir. 2004). 
370 Id. at 749–51, 807. 
371 See, e.g., supra notes 7–14 and accompanying text. 
372 See Nat’l Ass’n of Retired Fed. Employees v. Horner, 879 F.2d 873, 879 (D.C. Cir. 
1989). 
2019] TOWARDS A TRANSATLANTIC CONCEPT OF DATA PRIVACY 213 
 
also specifically considered the issue, and held that compilations  
of names and home addresses of private citizens are protected  
under the privacy exemption,373 although this is not the case for  
corporations.374 Moreover, the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment  
jurisprudence has recognized the intrusiveness of observing per-
sonal cell phone data. In Riley, the Court stated that the warrantless 
search of the data contained on a cell phone may be even more  
intrusive than the search of a home.375 In his reasoning, Chief Justice 
John Roberts acknowledged the high value of protecting private  
digital information in the search and seizure and public safety 
realm.376 The Supreme Court took privacy protection a step further 
in Carpenter.377 In this landmark case, the Court ruled that “an indi-
vidual maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy in the record of 
his physical movements as captured” through cell phone location 
data, and that “the Government must generally obtain a warrant  
supported by probable cause before acquiring such records.”378 
These decisions demonstrate that, in the evaluation criteria  
determining whether private data collected by government agencies 
should be made publicly available, American courts are not  
indifferent to the nature of the information in question, its sensitivity 
for the data subject’s private life, the data subject’s identity, the  
purpose of its storage and disclosure, and the public’s concern or 
interest in the information. The approach of American courts in the 
evaluation of the collection and use of information by private  
individuals or non-governmental entities likewise is to examine  
fundamental rights and other relevant interests on a case-by-case  
basis. Particularly the seminal 2001 case Bartnicki, which has set off 
 
373 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT GUIDE (2004), 
https://www.justice.gov/oip/foia-guide-2004-edition-exemption-6#exemption 
[https://perma.cc/25NM-NT5Q]; see also Bibles v. Oregon Natural Dessert Ass’n, 519 
U.S. 355 (1997); U.S. Dep’t of Def. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 114 S. Ct. 1006 (1994). 
374 In Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, the Court denied 
the personal privacy FOIA exemption to corporations. 489 U.S. 749, 749 (1989). For more 
on this case, see generally Patrick C. File, A History of Practical Obscurity: Clarifying and 
Contemplating the Twentieth Century Roots of a Digital Age Concept of Privacy, 6 U. 
BALT. J. MEDIA L. & ETHICS 4 (2017). 
375 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014). 
376 Id. at 2494–95. 
377 See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
378 Id. at 2217, 2221. 
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a wrenching debate over the privacy values society is actually  
willing to protect, illustrates well the Supreme Court’s approach to 
the publication of data breaches.379 While the case is not very recent, 
its principles still apply today. Moreover, the holding of the Court  
is flexible enough to deal with technological advances in communi-
cations and media research.380 
In Bartnicki, the Court analyzed the constitutionality of  
restrictions on publishing information381 illegally obtained through 
the interception of phone conversations.382 The Court set forth  
a three-prong balancing test that examines the conduct of the  
defendant, the nature of the disclosure, and the importance of the 
disclosure for the public interest. According to the Court, matters  
of public concern or interest are newsworthy matters that relate  
to current events.383 From the point of view of this Article, this raises 
the question as to whether search engine companies have the right  
in the United States to facilitate the publication and dissemination 
of personal information that does not deal with current,  
newsworthy subjects.384 
Financial records, such as social security debts (as in Google 
Spain), cannot be considered newsworthy.385 The main reason  
 
379 See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 121 S. Ct. 1753 (2001). 
380 Richard D. Shoop, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 449, 461 (2002). 
381 Bartnicki, 121 S. Ct. at 1756. For similar cases, see, e.g., Boehner v. McDermott, 191 
F.3d 463 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 532 U.S. 1050, 121 S. Ct. 2190; Peavy v. WFAA-
TV, Inc., 37 F. Supp. 2d 495 (N.D. Tex. 1999), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 221 F.3d 158 
(5th Cir. 2000). See also Eric Easton, Ten Years After: Bartnicki v. Vopper as Laboratory 
for First Amendment Advocacy and Analysis, 50 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 287, 294 (2011). 
382 See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (2012) (stating that “[e]xcept as otherwise specifically 
provided in this chapter any person who . . . (c) intentionally discloses, or endeavors to 
disclose, to any other person the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication, 
knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through the 
interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communication in violation of this subsection . . . 
shall be punished . . . .”). 
383 See Bartnicki, 121 S. Ct. at 1760; see also New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 
U.S. 713, 714 (1971). 
384 Bartnicki, 121 S. Ct. at 1760. 
385 See, e.g., Painting and Drywall Work Pres. Fund v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 936 
F.2d 1300, 1303 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Hopkins v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 929 F.2d 
81, 87 (2d Cir. 1991); Robyn v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 774 F. Supp. 587, 592 (D. Colo. 
1991); Adams v. Murakami, 813 P.2d 1348, 1365 (Cal. 1991) (Mosk, J., dissenting); Doyle 
v. State Bar, 648 P.2d 942, 945 (Cal. 1982); Valley Bank of Nev. v. Superior Court, 15 
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behind the Supreme Court granting Congress permission to restrict 
the speech of consumer reporting agencies and financial institutions 
is that consumer reports and private financial records are confiden-
tial and cannot be deemed to be newsworthy,386 since, in ordinary 
circumstances, this type of information can be described as the  
“intimate details of one’s private life.”387 Besides financial rec-
ords,388 due to their confidentiality, other types of sensitive personal 
information, such as medical conditions, religious affiliations,  
and sexual inclinations or associations are accessible only to author-
ized parties that need the information for permissible purposes  
(e.g., employment purposes, credit transactions, or insurance under-
writing).389 The requirement of permissible purposes constitutes a 
precaution to stop unauthorized third parties from disclosing per-
sonal information that is not newsworthy or has become obsolete.390 
The judicial approach just described is similar to that taken by 
the ECJ in Google Spain, where the Court required the search engine 
company to delist personal information as long as the information is 
“no longer relevant” or, in the words of the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Bartnicki, no longer newsworthy.391 An unflattering old piece of 
news, for instance, is less newsworthy than new information, as in 
general it lacks public interest. As the Supreme Court of California 
highlighted in Shulman, even an individual unwillingly involved in 
a newsworthy incident does not surrender all rights to privacy, and 
not everything said or done by that person is newsworthy392: 
 
Cal.3d 652, 656 (Cal. 1975); City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young, 466 P.2d 225, 231 (Cal. 
1970); Terry York Imports, Inc. v. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 242 Cal. Rptr. 790, 797 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1987); Tollefson v. Price, 430 P.2d 990, 992 (Ore. 1967); Palmisano v. Toth, 624 
A.2d 314, 318–19 (R.I. 1993). 
386 See supra note 385; see generally United States v. Bormes, 133. S. Ct. 12 (2012); 
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2667 (2011); Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 
550 U.S. 1 (2007). 
387 Wasser v. San Diego Union, 236 Cal. Rptr. 772, 775 (1987). 
388 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b). 
389 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 367, at 480. 
390 See SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 202, at 750–51 (5th ed. 2014). 
391 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 121 S. Ct. 1753, 1776 (2001). 
392 See Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc. 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998); see also Gary 
L. Bostwick, The Newsworthiness Element: Shulman v. Group W. Prods., Inc. Muddies the 
Waters, 19 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 225, 239–40 (1999). 
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First, the analysis of newsworthiness does involve 
courts to some degree in a normative assessment  
of the ‘social value’ of a publication. . . . All material 
that might attract readers or viewers is not, simply  
by virtue of its attractiveness, of legitimate public  
interest. Second, the evaluation of newsworthiness 
depends on the degree of intrusion and the extent to 
which the plaintiff played an important role in public 
events . . . , and thus on a comparison between the 
information revealed and the nature of the activity or 
event that brought the plaintiff to public attention.393 
Another point that the Bartnicki Court highlighted is the fact  
that the First Amendment protection is not absolute, but rather is 
conditioned upon whether personal information is obtained through 
proper means (e.g., via a permissible purpose or express consent) or 
in an unlawful way.394 The Court decided that broadcasting the  
stolen audio recording in question benefited from the protection  
offered by the First Amendment on account of the public importance 
of the recording, and on account of the fact that the defendant was 
not responsible for the initial breach although he was aware the  
recording had been obtained illegally.395 The Court specified it 
would consider punishing disclosure should the disclosing party 
have engaged in illegal activity to procure the information.396  
Indeed, as Dean Post pointed out, “the First Amendment has  
traditionally been dedicated to the creation of free public opinion, 
not to the creation of public knowledge.”397 In Dahlstrom, the Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit used the Bartnicki three-part test 
to determine that the First Amendment did not protect the Chicago 
Sun Times from liability for publishing personal information about 
five police officers that it had illegally obtained from government  
records and published without permission, because the information 
was not of sufficiently high public interest.398 The Court highlighted 
 
393 Shulman, 955 P.2d at 483–84 (citations omitted). 
394 See Bartnicki, 121 S. Ct. at 1760, 1764. 
395 See id. 
396 See id. at 1762. 
397 Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 487 (2011). 
398 Dahlstrom v. Sun-Times Media, LLC, 777 F.3d 937, 940–41, 954 (7th Cir. 2015). 
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the Supreme Court’s holding in Branzburg399 that the First Amend-
ment “does not guarantee the press a constitutional right of special 
access to information not available to the public generally.”400 
In respect of privacy and free communication, the social norms 
and values embodied in the United States law do not substantially 
differ from those of the EU law. Courts on both sides of the Atlantic 
are reluctant to accept a possible pre-determined hierarchy between 
data protection and the free flow of information in society. Data  
protection does not automatically override freedom of the press and 
freedom of expression or vice versa.401 Decisions are based on  
an issue-by-issue examination of different fundamental rights, and 
other interests.402 
In addition to practical solutions, some procedural principles  
and applications in terms of access to justice once data has been  
allegedly misused, too, are similar on both sides of the Atlantic.  
Influenced by the U.S. model, Article 80, section 1 of the GDPR 
gives individuals the right to bring a collective legal action in  
case of intrusion of privacy, an innovative type of action for the con-
tinental European legal tradition.403 Although the new European 
 
399 Id. at 946 (citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 92 S. Ct. 2646 (1972)). 
400 Branzburg, 92 S. Ct. at 2658. 
401 In the United States, see Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 97 S. Ct. 2849 
(1977) (pointing out the limits the First Amendment places on the right of entertainers to 
control public dissemination of their performances, and ruling for the entertainer stating 
that the First Amendment does not give the broadcaster the right to appropriate the 
entertainer’s entire act). In the EU, see Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia 
Espanola de Proteccion de Datos, 2014 E.C.R. 317; Case C-398/15, Camera di Commercio, 




402 In the United States, see, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 121 S. Ct. 1753, 1753 (2001). In 
the EU, see, e.g., Case C-92/09, Volker und Markus Schecke GbR v. Land Hessen, 2010 
E.C.R. I-11063, ¶ 48; Case C-543/09, Deutsche Telekom AG v. Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland, 2011 E.C.R. 279 ¶ 51, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/
?uri=CELEX%3A62009CJ0543 [https://perma.cc/2BXJ-VB7C]; Case C-291/12, Michael 
Schwarz v. Stadt Bochum, 2013 E.C.R. 401 ¶ 33, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/celex.
jsf?celex=62012CC0291&lang1=en&type=TXT&ancre= [https://perma.cc/XPT8-3VPL]. 
403 GDPR, supra note 17, art. 80 (“The data subject shall have the right to mandate a not-
for-profit body, organisation or association which has been properly constituted in 
accordance with the law of a Member State, has statutory objectives which are in the public 
interest, and is active in the field of the protection of data subjects’ rights and freedoms 
218           FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.      [Vol. XXX:139 
 
opt-in collective action falls short of the American opt-out class  
action right, it can be viewed as a first move towards increasing the 
number of group privacy claims in Europe. By establishing in the 
GDPR collective redress methods, the EU legislature has taken an  
important step forward in permitting consumers and members of  
labor unions to come together as a group, assert their privacy rights, 
and seek redress by way of claiming compensation.404 
While the EU legislature seems willing to expand collective  
action on the basis of a model seeking to avoid the kind of frivolous 
suits that many Europeans—with or without basis—associate with 
American class action practice,405 it is noteworthy that similar con-
cerns have arisen within the United States.406 As Professors Gelbach 
and Hensler noted, “nearly a decade’s worth of U.S. Supreme  
Court cases have restricted the scope and ease of use of the class 
action device.”407 Worries regarding potential abuse and misuse of 
class actions in data protection cases, among others, appear to be 
motivating legislatures and courts on both sides of the Atlantic to be 
cautious. This is a significant indicator suggesting that not only their 
substantive law on data protection, but also their procedural law 
governing the administration of privacy policies in general have 
started converging as a result of increased interaction between the 
legal cultures of the United States and the EU. 
 
with regard to the protection of their personal data to lodge the complaint on his or her 
behalf, to exercise . . . the right to receive compensation . . . .”).  
404 For more on this topic, see generally Laima Jančiūtė, Data Protection and the 
Construction of Collective Redress in Europe: Exploring Challenges and Opportunities, 
9(1) INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 2 (2019). 
405 Commission Recommendation 2013/396/ of 11 June 2013 on Common Principles for 
Injunctive and Compensatory Collective Redress Mechanisms in The Member States 
Concerning Violations of Rights Granted Under Union Law, O.J. (L 201) ¶ 10 
(“safeguarding against abuse”); ¶ 13 (“prevent abuse”); ¶ 19 (“in such a way that it cannot 
lead to an abuse of the system”); ¶ 20 (“[i]n order to avoid an abuse of the system”); ¶ 22 
(“the need to avoid abuse”). For more information, see generally EVA LEIN, DUNCAN 
FAIRGRIEVE, MARTA OTERO CRESPO & VINCENT SMITH, COLLECTIVE REDRESS IN EUROPE: 
WHY AND HOW? 1 (2015). 
406 See Deborah R. Hensler & Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Beyond “It Just Ain’t Worth It”: 
Alternative Strategies for Damage Class Action Reform, 64 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 137 
(2001). 
407 Jonah B. Gelbach & Deborah R. Hensler, What We Don’t Know About Class Actions 
but Hope to Know Soon, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 65 (2018). 
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CONCLUSION 
Oscar Wilde was correct when he said that no man is rich  
enough to buy back his past.408 One should assume guilt for past 
wrongdoing, but should also look forward to the future. That is why 
Wilde’s premise must not be understood as implying that personal 
data should be disclosed without any restriction. I have analyzed the 
tension that exists on both sides of the Atlantic between the public’s 
right to access information and data privacy. I have paid particular 
attention to the way recent advances, especially regarding commu-
nication technology and social media, have affected: 
i) the perceptions of privacy and that of  
freedom of expression, 
ii) the current and prospective reaction of the 
lawmaker in framing policies that aim at 
maximizing both interests, and 
iii) the standards and tests that courts use to  
evaluate the dynamics between rights and  
responsibilities. 
I have also asked whether and to what extent there is a similar  
legislative and judicial evolution in the United States and the EU. 
My goal has been to demonstrate, from both practical and  
conceptual perspectives, the dynamic nature of the multitude of  
variables that influence any decision regarding a possible loss of  
privacy or restriction of freedom of expression. 
My analysis shows that, through Google Spain and the adoption 
of the GDPR, EU law has shaped, to some degree, the evolution of 
American public policy. In this matter, EU law has perhaps been 
more influential than American privacy lobbyists. Yet, changes and 
initiatives at the state as well as national level do not solely result 
from an apparent economic threat from Europe, but also from a 
number of concerns regarding data security that have arisen within 
the United States. Recent statistics illustrate that most people are 
concerned about the ability of businesses to safeguard their financial 
and personal information. These concerns, along with several class 
action lawsuits filed following data leakage or contamination, show 
 
408 WILDE, supra note 1. 
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in a roundabout way the inefficiency of the system when it comes  
to protecting personal information in a satisfactory manner. There  
is a desire to settle the issue thanks to new legislative measures,  
instead of relying on the existing legal rules or the case law  
developing ad hoc exceptions to existing rules. One of the reasons 
for this desire is that the Privacy by Design principles, which require 
relatively costly implementation processes, have not yet been fol-
lowed by businesses. 
American legislative frameworks, such as the CCPA, that  
borrow the core principles of the GDPR, are directed toward  
broadening the scope of data security. These American regimes  
permit an effective and comprehensive protection, without compro-
mising the promotion of a free, open, and transparent society and 
market. They grant consumers, among others, a right similar to the 
right to erase conferred to EU citizens following Google Spain.  
Nevertheless, this legislative entitlement is not an unrestricted right 
to erase anything that we dislike from the Internet. In fact, figures 
provided by Google so far show that the number of removed pages 
is much less important than the number of web pages broken or lost 
every year, and corresponds to an extremely small percentage (well 
below 0.0000002%) of all the pages indexed by Google. 
On both sides of the Atlantic, the criteria adopted by the  
legislature in defining the penumbras of (data) privacy in general, 
and of the right to erase in particular, do not disregard the principles 
and standards set forth by case law. In the EU, a combined reading 
of Google Spain, Manni, and local decisions, such as the one handed 
down by the Court of Amsterdam, makes it clear that the law  
protects citizens against outdated or irrelevant links to search results 
that may intrude on a person’s privacy. EU citizens are not entitled 
to insist that all negative communications about them be removed 
from the Internet. The nature of the information in question, its  
sensitivity for the data subject, the data subject’s identity (private or 
corporate), the purpose (profit-making or non-profit public service) 
of its storage and disclosure, and the public’s concern or interest in 
the information are among the factors that influence the evaluation 
of the scope of the right to erase personal information. Ultimately, 
the exercise of the right to erase does not affect the existence of  
content, but merely the search results. 
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There is a noticeable parallel between the efforts of American 
courts and of European courts to find an approach that maximizes 
both freedom of expression and data security. Rulings such as  
Bartnicki, Shulman, Associated Press, and Carpenter demonstrate 
that American courts have adopted an ambivalent approach towards 
data protection. There is no monolithic test that weighs privacy and 
public interests. Courts weigh various interests, such as the “social 
value” of a publication and the importance of the role played by the 
plaintiff in the public events, and in each case the court makes an 
effort to establish a balance between protecting information that is 
not newsworthy or of legitimate public concern and broad public 
access to information that is not acutely personal. In such an evalu-
ation, not only are nature and origin of the information in question 
significant factors, but so too is the way the information was  
obtained. The publication of private information, particularly in 
cases where it is not of public concern or was obtained without  
consent, leads to similar results on both sides of the Atlantic. 
Although American and European legal cultures do assign  
different meanings to “public concern” and “consent,” it would  
nevertheless be an exaggeration to assert that, as a result of their 
differences, data privacy law in the United States and the EU offer 
conflicting solutions. Difference does not automatically imply  
incompatibility. A deeper analysis of their legislative efforts, case 
laws, and procedural rules reveal that neither U.S. law nor EU law 
can be contextualized through a black-and-white approach. On the 
contrary, the tests, criteria and thresholds used to define data privacy 
illustrate, on both sides of the Atlantic, the complex and dynamic 
nature of its assessment. Recent developments show that the  
principles that underpin such an assessment in the United States and 
the EU are getting closer. This convergence makes it likely that, in 
the long run, American and European governmental institutions and 
courts will reach similar conclusions when they decide privacy or 
data security cases presenting similar facts. 
